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PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE COVERAGE: A 





FRANCIS J. MOOTZ* 
INTRODUCTION 
Employment lawyers have witnessed a virtual revolution in the 
law of employment relations during the past thirty years. Although 
the federal government intervened substantially in private employ­
ment relationships in response to the economic catastrophe of the 
Great Depression,l employers remained largely free of regulation 
until the explosion of statutes and common law developments that 
commenced in the 1960s and continues today.2 Recent develop­
ments in common law tort and contract principles are particularly 
troubling for defense counsel in employment matters, since the re­
sulting doctrinal uncertainty renders it difficult to assess the client's 
exposure with any assurance until the appeals in the case have been 
exhausted. 
* © 1995, Francis J. Mootz, III, Professor of Law, Western New England College 
School of Law. This article is a revised version of a paper presented on August, 8,1995 
at the 1995 Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association in Chicago, Illinois. Pro­
fessor Mootz gratefully acknowledges the assistance and insight provided by Larry 
Weidemier (Class of '97). Mr. Weidemier formerly served as Manager, Commercial 
Lines Underwriting Training, at Hanover Insurance Company, Worcester, 
Massachusetts. 
1. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-69 (1988); 
Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits Act (Social Security 
Act) of 1935, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-33 (1988); and Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 
U.S.C.A. §§ 201-19 (1988). 
2. Federal statutes affording protections to employees address a wide range of 
issues and often are supplemented by state legislation. Much of the legislation defines 
the civil rights of applicants and employees. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title 
VII), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988), Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102­
106, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 19871, 2000e (1991»; Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-34; Americans With Disabili­
ties Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-213 (1990). Increasingly, however, legislation regulates 
the terms and conditions of employment. See, e.g., Employee Polygraph Protection 
Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2001-09 (1988); Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.c.A. 
§§ 2601-54 (1993). Common law. developments include expanded recognition of im­
plied-in-fact contracts premised on oral statements or employee handbooks, promissory 
estoppel, defamation, and wrongful discharge in contravention of public policy. 
5 
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Consider the uncomfortable position of the lawyer represent­
ing Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. ("MCP"). In 1985, the Wyoming 
Supreme Court held that MCP's employee handbook constituted 
part of the employment contract between MCP and its workers, 
and therefore that the handbook provisions were binding on the 
company.3 MCP immediately added a provision to its employee 
handbook which expressly disclaimed any intent that the handbook 
be contractually binding, and MCP amended the applications 
signed by all prospective employees to include a clause acknowl­
edging that the employment relationship would be terminable at 
the will of either party. An employee hired after MCP began using 
these disclaimers later sued MCP for breach of contract for failing 
to adhere to the disciplinary procedures outlined in the employee 
handbook. MCP obtained summary judgment, but the Wyoming 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for tria1.4 The 
court initially found that the language of the handbook was suffi­
cient to connote a promise giving rise to potential liability under a 
theory of promissory estoppel, notwithstanding the legal effective­
ness of the disclaimers to negate full contractual obligation.5 On 
rehearing, the court changed tack and held that MCP might be sub­
ject to contractual liability because the disclaimers were insuffi­
ciently conspicuous to be binding on McDonald.6 Justice Thomas, 
dissenting from both majority opinions, expressed his confusion and 
concern: 
I fear that corporate America, as it lives in the state of Wyoming, 
will be forced to conclude that the court is toying with it in some 
cruel and peculiar game of cat and mouse. In my judgment, we 
offered guidance in the earlier employee at will cases and, now, 
when confronted with an employer who followed that advice, we 
should not say that we really did not mean to adhere to our ear­
lier guidance.7 
This statement most likely captures the sentiment of many defense 
lawyers in employment matters. 
3. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 7fr2, 706-Q7 (Wyo. 1985). 
4. McDonald v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 789 P.2d 866 (Wyo. 1990), reaffd, 
820 P.2d 986 (1991). 
5. Id. at 869. 
6. McDonald, 820 P.2d at 989. Subsequently, the Wyoming Supreme Court reaf­
firmed and explained this latter rationale. See Lincoln v. Wackenhut Corp., 867 P.2d 
701, 703-04 (Wyo. 1994) (courts will enforce a "conspicuous and unambiguous dis­
claimer" in an employee handbook, as measured by the clarity and prominence of the 
disclaimer language, as well as the placement of the disclaimer in the handbook). 
7. McDonald, 789 P.2d at 872 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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The increasing plasticity of tort and contract doctrines in em­
ployment litigation is not an isolated development, but rather is 
part of a broader trend that represents the legacy of the Legal Real­
ism movement earlier this century. This trend may be summarized 
as a rejection of abstract doctrinal formalism in favor of paying 
much greater attention to the reasonable expectations of the parties 
to the transaction and also to the disparities in their bargaining 
power. These same concerns driving current developments in em­
ployment law have inspired similar and more longstanding develop­
ments in the law governing the relationship between an insurance 
carrier and its insured. Ironically, then, an employment lawyer will 
find that the doctrinal shifts magnifying her client's exposure to its 
employees are paralleled by doctrinal shifts in insurance law that 
greatly increase her client's ability to demand coverage under its 
insurance contracts for these legal expenses and judgments. Even 
the mouse gets to play the cat on occasion. 
In this Article, I will discuss basic insurance law principles that 
come into play when employers assert that their liability insurance 
provides coverage for employment disputes. Although the exam­
ples I use to explain these concepts pertain to coverage disputes in 
connection with employment litigation, I will focus on the basic 
principles and leave the detailed legal analysis of the coverage is­
sues to the other participants in the symposium.s 
8. Joseph P. Monteleone, Coverage Issues Under Commercial General Liability 
and Directors' and Officers' Liability Policies, 18 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 47 (1996); 
James E. Scheuermann & John K. Baillie, Employer's Liability and Errors and Omis­
sions Insurance Coverage for Employment-Related Claims, 18 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 71 
(1996); Larry M. Golub, A Checklist for Insurance Coverage in the Employment Litiga­
tion Context, 18 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 99 (1996); Steven R. Gilford & Robert M. Fo­
gler, Insurance Coverage Actions: Who, Where, and When to Sue, 18 W. NEW ENG. L. 
REv. 123 (1996); Joseph P. Monteleone, Employment Practices Liability Insurance 
(EPLI) Policies: Who Controls Selection of Defense Counsel, 18 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 
159 (1996); Wayne E. Borgeest, Anthony J. Fowler, & Michael M. Santocki, Employ­
ment Law Claims: Triggering Coverage Under "Claims Made" Policies, 18 W. NEW. 
ENG. L. REv. 179 (1996); Calum Anderson, Insurance Coverage for Employment-Re­
lated Litigation: Connecticut Law, 18 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 199 (1996); Marylou Fabbo, 
Audrey J. Samit, & Richard U. Stubbs, Jr., Insurance Coverage for Employment Claims 
in Massachusetts, 18 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 255 (1996). 
Previously published articles providing specific legal analysis of insurance coverage 
for employment litigation include: WAYNE E. BORGEEST & PATRICK M. KELLY, EM· 
PWYMENT LAw LIABILITY CLAIMS: WHAT You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT INSURANCE 
COVERAGE (eds., Practicing Law Institute 1995); Irene A. Sullivan & Adam C. Rosen­
berg, Insurance Coverage for Wrongful Termination and Employment Discrimination 
Claims, in INSURANCE COVERAGE LmGATION: 1994 (Practicing Law Institute); Robert 
A. Machson & Joseph P. Monteleone, Insurance Coverage for Wrongful Employment 
Practices Claims Under Various Liability Policies, 49 Bus. LAW. 689 (1994); James E. 
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At the outset, it is important to emphasize that insurance cov­
erage is not and should not be the only technique an employer uses 
to manage the risk arising out of employment-related practices. For 
several reasons, insurance may not even be the most desirable tech­
nique. First, coverage often will be a disputed matter, leading to 
uncertainty and perhaps to increased -transaction costs in dealing 
with employment claims. Additionally, insurance defense counsel 
retained by the insurance carrier may conduct the litigation in a 
manner that conflicts with the employer's broader human resources 
strategy for dealing with employee grievances. Finally, an insurer's 
underwriters may refuse to continue coverage for a reasonable 
price if the employer submits an inordinate number of employ­
ment-related claims within a particular period. 
On the other hand, insurance coverage might afford far more 
in terms of risk management than simply defending claims and pay­
ing losses. Depending on the importance to the insurer of the em­
ployer's account, the employer may be able to secure the insurer's 
agreement to establish a loss prevention and claim settlement pro­
cedure that would allow the employer to participate actively in risk 
management at every stage. Needless to say, the employer's coun­
sel should work together with the insurer in this regard; if possible, 
the employer might insist that an on-going risk management com­
mittee composed of counsel, claims, and loss control personnel 
from the insurer and the employer's human resource managers co­
ordinate the risk management strategies relating to employment 
practices. Such coordination would involve the employer rather 
than subjecting it to an insurer that reacts according to its own in­
terests when problems arise. 
I. RELEVANT LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICIES 
Litigation asserting that the employer's liability insurance pro­
vides coverage for employment disputes has become increasingly 
common as a result of the tremendous increase in employment liti­
gation. It is by no means unusual that employers would seek insur­
ance coverage of these claims, given that the "first liability 
Scheuermann, Insurance Coverage for Employment-Related Claims, 28 TORT & INS. 
L.J. 778 (1993); Kearney W. Kilens, Employer Insurance Coverage for Employment Liti­
gation, 79 ILL. BAR J. 32 (1991); David M. Spector & David B. Ritter, Insurance Cover­
age of Employee Claims Against Employers, 5 LAB. LAW. 615 (1989); John E. Peer & 
Ronald E. Mallen, Insurance Coverage of Employment Discrimination and Wrongful 
Termination Actions, (pts. 1 & 2) 54 DEF. CoUNS. J. 464-81 (1987) and 55 DEF. COUNS. 
J. 12-25 (1988). 
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insurance policies . . . were purchased by employers as protection 
against tort liability to employees resulting from work injuries" 
prior to the adoption of workers' compensation legislation.9 De­
fense counsel-whether in-house counsel supervising litigation or 
outside counsel retained by the employer to defend the suit-play 
an important role in assisting clients to identify potential insurance 
coverage for employment disputes. It is not possible to examine the 
potential for insurance coverage competently without drawing upon 
a detailed understanding of substantive employment law and the 
specifics of the claims being asserted against the employer. Re­
viewing the relevant policies is complicated by the fact that a 
number of common liability policies might provide coverage when 
an employer faces an employment-related claim.1° In this part of 
the Article, I briefly describe the liability policies that potentially 
afford coverage for typical employment-related claims. 
In order to identify relevant liability insurance policies, em­
ployment lawyers must understand the three-dimensional model of 
insurance coverage that is operative in many cases. First, the em­
ployer's liability insurance program has a "width," defined by the 
various policies that provide primary insurance coverage. Second, 
the liability program has a "height," defined by the different eco­
nomic levels of coverage provided by various insurance products. 
Finally, the liability program has a "length," defined by an historical 
succession of policies owned by the employer during the time pe­
riod implicated by the allegations in the complaint. Only by exam­
ining fully the "three dimensions" of the employer's insurance 
portfolio can the lawyer ensure that no potential coverage is over­
looked. I discuss each of these dimensions in tum. 
A. 	 Primary Liability Coverage: The Width of the Client's 
Insurance 
The Commercial General Liability ("CGL") Policy provides 
basic liability insurance coverage for various business entities and 
governmental units. A CGL policy serves as a general-purpose 
9. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 4.8(a) (student ed. 
1988). See C. ARTHUR WILLIAMS, JR., INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS UNDER WORKER'S 
COMPENSATION 3-4 (1969) (asserting that an 1886 employer's tort liability policy was 
the first instance of liability insurance in America). 
to. The general problem in the insurance market of the "heavy reliance on so 
many different forms of insurance and of the relatively disorganized way in which all 
this coverage has come into being" is analyzed by Professor Abraham in KENNETH S. 
ABRAHAM, DISTRffiUTING RISK 133-72 (1986). 
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foundation for the insured's liability coverage, much as the typical 
homeowner's policy provides individuals with their basic liability 
coverage. For purposes of employment-related claims, the CGL 
policy is fairly described as promising to pay, on behalf of the em­
ployer, the liabilities associated with bodily injuries and personal 
injuries caused by accidents. Certain risks, such as liability in­
curred by a business on account of the negligent operation of its 
automobiles, are covered by separate policies premised on different 
underwriting and pricing.ll The most important example of a pol­
icy that provides additional primary coverage is the Workers' Com­
pensation and Employer's Liability Policy, which in fact provides 
two distinct types of coverage for an employer's potential liability 
to employees.12 The workers' compensation coverage under the 
policy promises to pay all benefits due from the employer pursuant 
to the governing workers' compensation scheme. Workers' com­
pensation statutes vary from state to state, sometimes to a signifi­
cant degree.13 Generally, these statutory schemes impose no-fault 
liability on employers to pay death benefits, medical and rehabilita­
tion expenses, and/or lost wages to employees suffering injuries that 
arise out of and occur during the course of their employment; in 
exchange, the statutes insulate the employer from what would often 
11. In the early stages of this project, my research assistant, Larry Weidemier, 
suggested that it was only a matter of time before an industrious lawyer sought cover­
age for employment-related liabilities under the business auto policy. While updating 
my research in January, 1996, I was only mildly surprised to find an example of just such 
a claim. See Edquist v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., No. C6-95-1111, 1995 WL 635179 
(Minn. App. Oct. 31, 1995) (unpublished opinion) (rejecting the insured's argument 
that coverage under its business auto policy was triggered by a claim that its area man­
ager sexually assaulted and harassed a female subordinate while in a company car, 
given that there was no "occurrence" as required by the policy). 
12. As one court recently summarized: 

[E]mployers' liability insurance is traditionally written in conjunction with 

workers' compensation policies, and is intended to serve as a "gap-filler," pro­

viding protection to the employer in those situations where the employee has a 

right to bring a tort action despite the provisions of the workers' compensation 

statute or the employee is not subject to the workers' compensation law. Gen­

erally, these two kinds of coverage are mutually exclusive. 

Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins., 718 P.2d 920, 927 (Cal. 1986) (citations 
omitted). See also Ottumwa Hous. Auth. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 495 
N.W.2d 723, 729 (Iowa 1993) ("Employers' liability insurance protects an employer 
against common-law liabilities for injuries resulting to employees. In contrast, workers' 
compensation insurance protects the employer against liability imposed by the worker's 
compensation acts."). 
13. Several states still make the workers' compensation scheme elective for both 
employer and employee, a carryover from the necessity to avoid constitutional chal­
lenge earlier this century. ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S CoMPENSATION § 5.20 (desk 
ed.1988). 
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be more expansive tort liability.14 The employer's liability cover­
age, in contrast, promises to pay on behalf of employers certain lia­
bilities incurred to employees that fall outside the scope of the 
workers' compensation statutes. Unless and until Employment-Re­
lated Practices Liability endorsements or policies become widely 
available to employers, the CGL policy and Workers' Compensa­
tion and Employers' Liability Policy will continue to be the most 
pertinent primary coverages implicated by employment related 
claims. 
Another liability policy that may provide coverage for an em­
ployment claim is Directors & Officers ("D&O") Liability Insur­
ance. In many cases, claims made against a business by a 
disgruntled or former employee will also include separate claims 
against individual corporate officials. A D&O policy generally in­
demnifies a company for any settlements, judgments, and expenses 
that it incurs as a result of claims premised on wrongful acts com­
mitted by its directors and officers acting in their official capacity. 
D&O policies may also insure the directors and officers personally. 
Even more specific is Pension and Welfare Fund Fiduciary Liability 
Insurance, which insures pension and welfare benefit plans, admin­
istrators, and trustees against suits alleging wrongful acts in connec­
tion with the operation of such plans. Given the broad preemptive 
effect of ERISA,15 many employment-related claims in fact amount 
to claimed rights under ERISA.16 
14. See, e.g., Suckow v. NEOWA FS, Inc., 445 N.W.2d 776, 779 (Iowa 1989) ("[an] 
employer's immunity is the quid pro quo by which the employer gives up his nonnal 
defenses and assumes automatic liability, while the employee gives up his right to com­
mon law verdicts"). See generally LARSON, supra note 13, at §1.10; Richard A. Epstein, 
The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers' Compensation Law, 16 GA. 
L. REv. 775, 800-03 (1982) (offering an economic justification of the quid pro quo em­
bodied in workers' compensation acts). 
15. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1001-1461 (1988). ERISA's broad preemption provision is found at 29 U.S.C. § 1144 
(1988). 
16. See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990); Sanson v. 
General Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 618, 621 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1578 
(1993) (holding that the plaintiff employee's state law claims were preempted by ER­
ISA, even though ERISA afforded no relief for the alleged wrongdoing). Because the 
remedies afforded by ERISA have been construed very narrowly by the courts, it is 
unlikely that a fiduciary responsibility policy will provide coverage in an employment­
related claim since the employee often will only be awarded wrongfully withheld bene­
fits, which are outside the scope of covered losses. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. 
v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985) and its developing progeny. However, if the developing 
federal common law cause of action of equitable estoppel survives Supreme Court scru­
tiny, it may well be that a suit for promised benefits that admittedly are outside the 
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In summary, several policies or endorsements providing pri­
mary liability insurance potentially will provide coverage for em­
ployment disputes. Counsel assisting an employer to review its 
liability coverage must fully review the applicable "width" of the 
employer's primary insurance protection. 
B. 	 Excess Liability Coverage: The «Height" of the Client's 
Insurance 
Many businesses purchase one or more levels of coverage to 
supplement their primary liability coverages. «Follow Form" Ex­
cess Liability Policies generally provide coverage under the same 
terms as the primary policy for liability in excess of those policy 
limits. Typically, excess policies supplement an underlying primary 
program of liability coverage consisting of CGL, Workers' Com­
pensation and Employers' Liability, and Business Auto Liability 
coverages. In comparison, Umbrella Excess Liability Policies com­
bine excess coverage with supplemental coverage intended to fill 
certain "gaps" in the primary insurance coverageP Because the 
insurance carriers participating in this market have developed their 
own policy forms, any umbrella policy must be reviewed carefully, 
especially if no potential coverage exists under the employer's pri­
mary liability insurance policies.I8 
These levels of coverages and their inter-relationship are illus­
trated in the following example. Assume that a company has 
purchased a CGL policy that includes a $25,000 deductible and a 
policy limit of $500,000, excess coverage for liability between 
$500,000 and $1 million, and umbrella coverage up to a limit of $10 
million. If an employee recovers a $2 million verdict, all of which is 
covered under these liability policies, the employer would pay the 
$25,000 deductible, the CGL carrier would pay $475,000, the excess 
scope of unambiguous plan language will trigger coverage. See, e.g. Black v. TIC Inv. 
Corp., 900 F.2d 112, 114-15 (7th Cir. 1990). 
17. A court recently described the "unique and special coverage" afforded by an 
umbrella policy by noting that "under certain circumstances, the policy acts as primary 
insurance, where there is coverage under the [umbrella] policy but not under any other 
regular primary policy issued" to the employer. Dixon Distrib. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 
612 N.E.2d 846, 849-50 (III. App. Ct. 1993), affd, 641 N.E.2d 395 (III. 1994). 
18. Thus, in a number of cases employers have sought coverage for employment 
disputes from the.ir umbrella carrier. See, e.g., ]ostens Inc. v. Northfield Ins. Co., 527 
N.W.2d 116 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), Dixon Distrib. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 641 N.E.2d 
395 (Ill. 1994), Teague Motor Co. v. Federated Servo Ins. Co., 869 P.2d 1130 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1994); Clark-Peterson Co. v. Independent Ins. Assoc. Ltd., 492 N.W.2d 675 (Iowa 
1992). 
13 1996] PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE COVERAGE 
carrier would pay $500,000, and the umbrella carrier would pay $1 
million. Because employment claims may result in large verdicts, it 
is important to investigate the full "height" of the employer's insur­
ance coverage. Moreover, even in the absence of coverage at the 
primary level of insurance, in some cases an umbrella policy may 
provide coverage for the claim. An umbrella policy providing cov­
erage for an event not covered by the underlying primary policies 
generally will do so only over a "retained limit," which is equivalent 
to a deductible. 




Collecting and reviewing the relevant policies that potentially 
provide coverage for employment litigation may be further compli­
cated if the employee alleges continuing wrongful acts by the em­
ployer over a period of several years. Under standard Occurrence 
Coverage policies, each and every policy in force at the time of the 
alleged wrongful acts by the employer potentially provides cover­
age for the claim. Therefore, it is important to identify the time 
periods during which the alleged injuries occurred and to review all 
liability policies in force during this period, regardless of whether 
the policies continue in force at the time that the claim for coverage 
is asserted. In response to the long "tail" of liability facing carriers 
utilizing occurrence coverage, some insurers recently have begun to 
issue liability policies that provide only Claims Made Coverage.19 
In its pure form, the coverage "trigger" for this more restrictive pol­
icy is a claim made against the insured during the policy term for an 
occurrence taking place during the policy term. Generally, how­
ever, coverage is expanded to include claims arising out of occur­
rences taking place on or after the "retroactive date" specified in 
19. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 9, at § 5.10(d)(3) (noting that in recent 
years "most liability insurers have sought to expand dramatically the use of 'claims 
made' policies to liability risks beyond the professional liability areas in which these 
coverages came to be used extensively in the 1970s" but also noting the resistance to 
this move expected in the market). In fact, CGL "occurrence" policies continue to 
dominate the standard market, notwithstanding the availability, since 1985, of an Insur­
ance Services Office "claims made" CGL policy. However, specialty products such as 
fiduciary insurance for pension plan administrators are more likely to be written on a 
"claims made" basis. See, e.g., Gulf Resources & Chern. Corp. v. Gavine, 763 F. Supp. 
1073 (D. Idaho 1991). Although Employment Practices Liability Insurance policies are 
still relatively new to the market and therefore, still developing in response to consumer 
demand, it is apparent that these policies will be written almost exclusively on a "claims 
made" basis. 
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the policy. Additionally, many policies provide coverage for claims 
made during an "extended reporting period," which follows the 
normal expiration of the policy. 
A simple example illustrates the distinction between Occur­
rence and Claims Made coverage. Assume that an employer is sued 
in 1994 for invasions of privacy that allegedly occurred during 1992, 
as might be the case if the employer's former practice of 
clandestinely searching through personal effects in employee lock­
ers is only later discovered. The employer should investigate poten­
tial coverage under any occurrence policies in effect during 1992, as 
well as under any claims made policies in effect during 1994. 
D. An Example of the Three-Dimensional Model 
The following hypothetical scenario demonstrates the signifi­
cance of the three-dimensional model of insurance protection. As­
sume that an employee files a workers' compensation claim for a 
job-related injury on December 1, 1987. The employee subse­
quently resigns in February, 1990, and promptly files a lawsuit con­
sisting of a number of causes of action. In her complaint, the 
employee alleges that the employer immediately responded to her 
workers' compensation filing by mounting a three year retaliatory 
campaign that consisted of slandering the employee in front of 
other employees and defaming her in performance appraisals, lead­
fig her to quit her employment in order to escape intolerable work­
ing conditions. Upon her resignation, the employee requested 
severance payments on the ground that her employment had been 
terminated, but her request was denied by the administrators of the 
employer's benefits plan. The employee claims that she was con­
structively discharged and is now suing for wrongful discharge, in­
tentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, defamation, 
and an arbitrary and capricious denial of benefits due under an ER­
ISA-governed plan.20 
20. These allegations state a viable claim in tort for wrongful discharge on ac­
count of the employer's violation of the clear public policy in favor of workers exercis­
ing their statutory right to obtain workers' compensation benefits. See, e.g., Kelsay v. 
Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353 (Ill. 1978). Although courts have been reluctant to per­
mit plaintiffs to recover on emotional distress theories merely because they were termi­
nated in a brusque manner, the plaintiff might state a cause of action if she alleges that 
the employer drove her to resign by outrageous conduct that inflicted severe emotional 
distress. See, e.g., Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1991). More­
over, the employee states a viable claim for slander with regard to the statements made 
to fellow employees and also might state a claim for defamation with respect to the 
performance appraisals under a theory of self-publication. See, e.g., Lewis v. Equitable 
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In response to this claim, the employer will need to review a 
number of liability policies to determine whether insurance cover­
age is available. If the employer purchased a CGL occurrence cov­
erage policy from Company A for two successive years beginning 
January 1, 1987, a CGL occurrence coverage policy from Company 
B for the policy year beginning January 1, 1989, and a CGL claims 
made policy from Company C each year since January 1, 1990, it 
will be necessary to review both policies issued by Company A, the 
policy issued by Company B, and the policy issued by Company C 
for the year 1990. Moreover, the employer's Workers' Compensa­
tion and Employers' Liability Policy might provide coverage to the 
extent that the employer seeks a dismissal of part of the civil action 
by asserting the exclusivity of the workers' compensation remedy 
for the employee's emotional distress injuries. Additionally, liabil­
ity policies covering the actions of officers, directors, and plan fidu­
ciaries may be implicated, given the probability that the plaintiff 
would sue such individuals personally in her complaint. Finally, ex­
cess and umbrella policies may provide coverage in the event of a 
large plaintiff's verdict. Consequently, in this hypothetical case it is 
necessary to review a number of insurance policies to assess poten­
tial coverage for the claims asserted by the plaintiff.21 
II. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE COVERAGE 
With the relevant liability insurance policies in hand, the em­
ployment lawyer will be in a position to assist with her client's as­
sessment of whether coverage potentially exists. Coverage is a 
contractual undertaking by the insurance carrier to accept the risk 
of certain losses that may be incurred by the insured party in the 
future. Liability policies provide what is known as third-party in-
Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986). A plan participant may bring an 
action under ERISA to compel payment of benefits due them under the plan, 29 U.S.c. 
§ 1132(a)(I)(B) (1988), but if the plan accords discretionary powers to the administra­
tor to determine eligibility for benefits, the court may reverse an administrator's denial 
of benefits only if it is found to be arbitrary or capricious. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 
v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989). 
21. Cf, Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. S-W Indus., Inc., 39 F.3d 1324 (6th Cir. 
1994) (claims for coverage against seven insurers who provided a variety of policies 
during the relevant period that the employee allegedly suffered injury); Fidelity & 
Ouar. Ins. Underwriters. Inc. v. Everett I. Brown Co., 25 F.3d 484 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(claims for coverage under a liability package which included a primary liability policy. 
an excess policy. and a workers' compensation and employers' liability policy); Dixon 
Distrib. Co., 641 N.E.2d 395 (claims for coverage under four policies comprising a com­
prehensive commercial insurance package, including a primary liability policy. an um­
brella policy, and a workers' compensation and employers' liability policy). 
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surance, since they afford coverage to the insured for legal liabilities 
to third persons that may arise in the future. The scope of coverage 
is defined by the written contract (the policy), which must be read 
carefully and in its entirety. Although I use the language of the 
CGL policy to provide examples of the concepts and principles that 
I will be discussing, liability policies generally follow the same basic 
format. 
The Insurance Services Office's ("ISO")22 CGL policy (10/93 
edition) follows a straightforward format. Section I sets forth the 
Coverages provided by the policy. Each coverage is stated in terms 
of an Insuring Agreement that defines the grant of coverage and 
Exclusions that limit the scope of the Insuring Agreement. Section 
II defines the persons and entities who are insured under the policy. 
Section III defines the limits of insurance, as expressed in the dollar 
amounts set forth on the Declarations page of the policy. Section 
IV sets forth conditions of the insurance contract, including rights 
and duties of both the insurer and the insured. Finally, and of great 
importance, Section V provides definitions of the key terms used 
throughout the policy. In the subsections that follow, I discuss basic 
legal principles that govern the interpretation of a liability policy. I 
will focus on selected topics that arise when considering the four 
general questions raised by coverage litigation: (1) is the claim 
within the scope of coverage, (2) do any exclusions eliminate or 
restrict such coverage, (3) has the insured complied with its duties 
under the policy, and (4) has the insurer complied with its duty to 
provide a defense of the action and to pay losses for a covered 
event? 
One important caveat is in order. The ISO regularly amends 
its standard policy forms and regularly creates optional endorse­
ments. Additionally, insurance carriers may draft their own policies 
or endorsements that differ from the current ISO forms. Although 
the foundational legal principles discussed in this section are un­
likely to change in the near future, the specific policy language used 
as examples may very well differ from the terms contained in a par­
ticular CGL policy. Thus, the growing body of case law interpreting 
the availability of coverage for employment related disputes must 
be reviewed carefully, since the decisions in many of these cases­
even cases only several years old-are predicated on policy lan­
22. Insurance Services Office, Inc. is a national insurance industry service organi­
zation that develops and files coverage forms, promulgates advisory loss costs, and per­
forms other services for and on behalf of its member companies. 
17 1996] PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE COVERAGE 
guage no longer used by many insurance carriers. As is always the 
case in analyzing a contract, painstaking attention must be paid to 
the precise terms of the contract before researching applicable legal 
precedent. 
A. Coverage 
The CGL policy is not an "all risks" policy that insures against 
any and all claims and losses suffered by the employer. Iristead, the 
CGL policy obligates the insurer to assume only certain specified 
risks. Consequently, the Insuring Agreement simultaneously grants 
coverage and also limits coverage. The CGL policy consists of 
three separate grants of coverage, the first two of which are perti­
nent to employment related claims. The Insuring Agreement of 
Coverage A provides coverage for damages resulting from "'bodily 
injury' or 'property damage'" and "caused by an 'occurrence'." In 
the employment litigation context, the requirement of "bodily in­
jury" is crucial because an employee may allege only economic or 
reputational injury. Moreover, the definition of "occurrence" as an 
"accident" is also important because it would appear to preclude 
coverage of claims when the employee alleges that her injuries re­
sulted from actions-such as termination of employment-in­
tended by her employer. 
The Insuring Agreement of Coverage B provides coverage for 
damages resulting from" 'personal injury' or 'advertising injury,'" 
without a limitation to accidental occurrences. The policy defini­
tion of "personal injury" makes clear that Coverage B provides cov~ 
erage for non-bodily injuries arising out of one or more of the listed 
torts, including libel and slander. Given the increasing frequency of 
defamation claims being added to employment claims, many em­
ployers rely upon Coverage B to demand coverage. 
Courts employ basic insurance law principles to determine 
whether the employee's complaint potentially asserts that she has 
suffered a bodily injury caused by an accident, a personal injury, or 
both. Courts uniformly read Insuring Agreements broadly, reason­
ing that the insurance company has unilaterally drafted the policy 
from a position of far greater sophistication and understanding of 
the underwriting process than the average insured. The following 
quote is representative of the boilerplate analysis used by courts in 
assessing coverage: "Contract terms should be read as a reasonable 
person in the insured's position would have understood them .... 
The insurer has an affirmative duty to define coverage limitations in 
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clear and explicit terms .... An insurance contract is generally liber­
ally construed against the insurer."23 The principle coverage battles 
under the CGL policy in the context of employment related suits, 
then, generally concern how broadly the courts will read the terms 
"bodily injury," "occurrence," and "personal injury" in favor of the 
employer. These specific coverage issues under the CGL policy, 
and similar coverage issues under other liability policies, are ana­
lyzed by the articles in this symposium. 
B. Exclusions 
If coverage is afforded by the Insuring Agreement, it then is 
necessary to determine whether the policy excludes the particular 
risk from coverage. Insurers regularly define the scope of coverage 
in relatively inclusive terms, and then set forth specific limitations 
on this broad grant of coverage to tailor the risk assumed under the 
policy. Exclusions may be classified generally as serving one or 
more of the following interests: (1) designating certain risks as bet­
ter covered elsewhere, i.e., with a different insurance product, (2) 
designating certain risks as insurable only upon the payment of an 
additional premium, and (3) designating certain risks as uninsurable 
in the standard market, or in some cases uninsurable in the insur­
ance market as a whole. Because an exclusion works to "take 
back" a grant of coverage, courts narrowly construe the language of 
the exclusion and may shift the burden of proof to the insurer to 
prove that the otherwise covered risk has been excluded.24 
Coverage A ("bodily injury" caused by an "occurrence") in­
cludes fourteen exclusions, at least three of which may affect cover­
age for employment related claims. The "Expected or Intended 
Injury" exclusion excludes a class of uninsurable risks, such as an 
insured committing an unprovoked battery with the intent to cause 
bodily injury; additionally, the exclusion removes certain iilsurable 
intentional torts from coverage that are better covered elsewhere, 
namely under Coverage B. The "Workers' Compensation" and 
23. Lapeka, Inc. v. Security Nat'l Ins. Co., 814 F. Supp. 1540, 1544-45 (D. Kan. 
1993) (determining that unintentional discrimination may be an "occurrence," but that 
the plaintiffs did not suffer "bodily injury" as a result) (citations omitted). 
24. Western Heritage Ins. Co. v. Magic Years Learning Ctrs. and Child Care, Inc., 
45 F.3d 85, 88 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that under Texas law exclusions are construed 
even more strictly against the insurer than coverage provisions); Lapeka, Inc., 814 F. 
Supp. at 1545 (noting that the distinction between coverage and exclusionary provisions 
is determinative of the burden of proof under Kansas law); Motor Panels, Inc. v. Bir­
mingham Fire Ins. Co., No. 3:91CY7198, 1991 WL 516545, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 27, 
1991). 
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"Employers' Liability" exclusions in Coverage A both serve to re­
move coverage on the basis that the risks are better covered else­
where, namely the Workers' Compensation and Employers' 
Liability Policy. However, the broad language excluding "bodily in­
jury to an employee ... arising out of and in the course of employ­
ment" likely will exclude some risks that are not within the plain 
meaning of the Workers' Compensation and Employers' Liability 
coverage, thereby rendering certain claims uninsurable in the stan­
dard market.25 
The exclusions in Coverage B are less pertinent to employment 
litigation generally, but the exclusion of personal injury "arising out 
of the willful violation of a penal statute or ordinance committed by 
or with the consent of the insured" designates an uninsurable risk 
that may be relevant to some employment claims.26 Finally, the 
ISO "Employment-Related Practices Exclusion" endorsement (10/ 
93 edition), designed to amend both Coverage A and Coverage B, 
represents an attempt by insurers to remove most employment liti­
gation from the scope of basic coverage provided by the CGL pol­
icy. If this exclusion is used by an insurer in conjunction with the 
emerging optional endorsement for "Employment Practices Liabil­
ity" coverage, it would represent the insurer's decision that the risk 
of employment-related claims will be assumed only for an addi­
tional premium. At present, however, several insurers have re­
sponded to the tremendous increase in coverage litigation brought 
by employers by amending their policies to include various forms of 
employment practices related exclusions, leaving these risks unin­
surable except under "surplus lines" insurance products in the spe­
cialty market.27 Insurers have been successful in enforcing these 
exclusions, and so it should be expected that liability policies will 
include such clauses with increasing frequency.28 
25. Ottumwa Hous. Auth. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 495 N.W.2d 723, 727 
(Iowa 1993). 
26. See, e.g., MGM, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 855 P.2d 77, 80 (Kan. 1993) 
(enforcing exclusion by denying coverage to an employer that subjected its employees 
to wiretaps that were illegal under the federal criminal code). 
27. Machson & Monteleone, supra note 8, at 711-13. 
28. See, e.g., Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 259 (1994) 
(exclusions in Workers' Compensation and Employers' Liability Policy), reh'g denied, 
40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 808 (1995); Teague Motor Co. v. Federated Servo Ins. Co., 869 P.2d 
1130 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (exclusion of employment discrimination from umbrella 
policy); Old Republic Ins. Co. V. Comprehensive Health Care Assoc., Inc., 2 F.3d 105 
(5th Cir. 1993) (enforcing "sexual abuse" exclusion and "employment-related claim" 
exclusion in CGL policy and enforcing an "employment" exclusion in umbrella policy); 
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C. Insured's Duties: Notice and Cooperation 
The conditions section of the CGL policy is designed to create 
a claim settlement process that ensures effective protection under 
the policy for the employer, while also affording the insurer the in­
formation it needs to settle the employer's claim properly. The em­
ployer's principal duties under the policy are to provide timely 
notice of the potentially covered occurrence and to cooperate with 
the insurer's investigation and defense of the action. The notifica­
tion requirement provides that the employer must notify the insurer 
"as soon as practicable of an occurrence or an offense which may 
result in a claim" by providing the known details of the occurrence. 
Additionally, the employer must notify the insurer as soon as prac­
ticable of any claim or suit to which the policy applies by immedi­
ately sending "copies of any demands, notices, summonses or legal 
papers." This latter duty is particularly important, since the insurer 
is under the obligation to defend the insured in the suit and is enti­
tled to conduct the litigation. 
The employer's failure to comply with its obligations under the 
contract certainly will impair the settlement process and may estab­
lish a defense to enforcement of the policy in favor of the insurer. 
Generally, courts are hesitant to deprive the third party claimant of 
a source of funds to satisfy a judgment solely on the basis of the 
insured's failure to comply with the notice provisions of the policy. 
In many jurisdictions, therefore, the insurer is excused from per­
formance under the policy only if the delay in notice has prejudiced 
its efforts to investigate and defend the claim.29 However, the in­
surer's duty to provide a defense to the employer does not benefit 
the third-party claimant directly. Consequently, courts may be 
more willing to preclude an employer from obtaining reimburse-
Reliable Springs Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 869 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1989) 
(enforcing "discrimination and unfair employment practices" exclusion). 
29. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 9, at § 7.2(e) (describing the balancing test 
employed by many courts to determine whether a failure to provide notice prejudices 
the insured sufficiently to warrant denying a source of funds to the third party claimant 
by excusing the insurer of its duty to pay damages on behalf of the insured); ROBERT H. 
JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 404-07 (1987) ("The approach requiring 
the insurer to demonstrate it was prejudiced is obtaining an increasing following."). 
See, e.g., Thin City Fire Ins. Co. v. King County, 749 F. Supp. 230 (W.D. Wash. 1990) 
(employer was denied coverage under policy because insurer was prejudiced when the 
employer failed to notify the insurer of the suit until three years after it was filed, four 
months after the plaintiff's verdict at trial, and only one day prior to a court-arranged 
conference to settle the appeal, despite the employer's claim that it reasonably believed 
that its exposure in the case would not exceed the applicable deductible), affd, 942 F.2d 
794 (1991). 
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ment of its defense costs when it unreasonably delays providing no­
tice of the suit to the insurance carrier.30 Therefore, it is vital that 
the employment lawyer assist the employer in identifying any and 
all liability policies that potentially provide coverage for an occur­
rence or claim as soon as possible, thus enabling the employer to 
provide prompt notice to the pertinent carriers in order to facilitate 
the claim processing and to preserve its right to secure reimburse­
ment for any defense costs incurred until such time as the insurer 
assumes the defense. 
D. Insurer's Duties: Defense and Indemnification 
The principal obligation of the insurer is to pay covered losses. 
The CGL policy provides that the insurer "will pay those sums that 
the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages" for cov­
ered losses. This obligation is straightforward. Although complex 
disputes may arise over whether the losses are covered under the 
policy, the insurer's duty to pay damages on behalf of the insured 
usually is not controversial once these matters have been adjudi­
cated.3! An important exception is the line of "bad faith" cases that 
involve an insurer refusing to settle a pending claim within the pol­
30. See, e.g., SL Indus., Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1266, 1272­
73 (N.J. 1992). In SL Industries, the employee had sued for age discrimination, and the 
carrier had denied coverage on the ground that no "bodily injury" or "personal injury," 
as those terms were defined in the policy, had occurred. Discovery revealed that the 
employee was seeking recovery for emotional pain and suffering, for which he had re­
ceived treatment. The insured did not disclose this information to the insurer for an­
other two years. The court stated that the duty to defend is inextricably linked with the 
insurer's right to control the litigation, a right which could no longer be enforced with 
respect to the prior two years of litigation. Consequently, the court held that "when the 
insured's delay in providing relevant information prevents the insurer from assuming 
control of the defense, the insurance company is liable only for that portion of the 
defense costs arising after it was informed of the facts triggering the duty to defend." 
Id. 
31. Refusing to indemnify the employer after the litigation has ended with a ver­
dict that falls within the coverage of the policy will likely render the insurer subject to a 
tort action for bad faith. See, e.g., Bugni v. Employer's Ins. of Wausau, 405 N.W.2d 84 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1987). In Bugni, the insured employer sued for bad faith breach when 
the primary and excess carriers refused to indemnify him for his defense expenditures 
and the jury verdict entered in favor of the employee. The court held that the jury 
verdict-finding a wrongful discharge but no bad faith on the part of the employer­
eliminated the insurer's arguments that the allegations concerned intentional actions 
excluded by the policy. "[W]e conclude that, once the federal verdict was rendered, 
none of the defenses the [insurer] asserted had a reasonable basis in the law. None of 
the propositions upon which [the insurer] founded its refusal to pay was fairly debata­
ble." Id. The case was remanded for further fact-finding regarding the bad faith claim. 
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icy limits, thereby_ exposing the insured to excess liability.32 
In contrast to the duty to pay damages, the insurer's "right and 
duty" to defend the employer in suits seeking such damages raises 
more complex issues. The Insuring Agreements for Coverages A 
and B provide that the insurance company "will have the right and 
duty to defend any suit seeking" damages that fall within the cover­
age provisions. Employment-related litigation often involves fact­
specific claims arising in an unsettled or contested area of law. The 
resulting extensive discovery and motion practice means that de­
fense costs often are as substantial as the ultimate recovery or set­
tlement obtained by the employee. Thus, the insured's obligation 
to provide a defense is an extremely important part of the Insuring 
Agreement. Although many states continue to measure the in­
surer's duty to defend solely against the allegations of the underly­
ing complaint, other states have more broadly interpreted the 
clause to require that the duty to defend be assessed in light of all 
32. The landmark case establishing the modern cause of action for "bad faith" in 
insurance claims settlement involved an insurer that failed to take account of its in­
sured's interests when it declined to settle the case within the policy limits, thereby 
subjecting the insured to liability in the amount that the judgment exceeded the policy 
limits. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958). Although pre­
mised on the general duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract, id. at 
200, insurance carriers are subjected to tort damages when they breach this contractual 
duty. Cf Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988) (refusing to extend 
tort damages beyond the insurance context, holding that only contract damages are 
available to an employee suing his employer for a breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing). The unique "bad faith" cause of action in the insurance 
context "evolved as a means of imposing sanctions on insurers whose negligence or 
intentional misconduct frustrate the smooth functioning of the insurance mechanism." 
STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH AcnONS: LIABILITY AND DAMAGES § 1.11 (1994). If 
not subjected to tort damages, insurers would be free to withhold a reasonable settle­
ment offer in an effort to obtain a defendant's verdict at trial, knowing that their expo­
sure for this calculated risk is "capped" by the policy limits. Id. at § 2.03. 
The "bad faith" doctrine was raised in an interesting manner by an employer in 
Ottumwa Hous. Auth. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 495 N.W.2d 723 (Iowa 1993). 
In Ottumwa, the employee had sued for sex discrimination and filed a claim for work­
ers' compensation benefits. The insurer defended the workers' compensation claim but 
refused to defend the discrimination suit under either the Workers' Compensation pol­
icy or the CGL policy. The employee eventually withdrew her claim for workers' com­
pensation benefits in the face of a vigorous defense and pursued only her civil claims. 
The employer claimed in later litigation against the insurer that the insurer had acted in 
bad faith by refusing to settle the workers' compensation claim, on the theory that set­
tlement of the workers' compensation claim would have assisted with the disposition of 
the civil claim. The court made short work of responding to this assertion: "Because 
there was no basis for [the employee's] workers' compensation claim, State Farm­
under the duty to defend provision-had every right to defend the claim in the way it 
did." Id. at 730. 
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relevant extrinsic facts.33 As one court recently explained, the lib­
eral rule is warranted because employers "expect their coverage 
and defense benefits to be determined by the nature of the claim 
against them, not by the fortuity of how the plaintiff, a third party 
chooses to phrase the complaint."34 Even when judged only against 
the allegations in the complaint, the general rule is that the duty to 
defend is triggered when the potential exists for the employee to 
prevail against an insured on the basis of a covered occurrence or 
claim.35 
33. See generally 7C JOHN A. ApPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAcncE § 4683 
(Berdal ed., 1979, West Supp.). For example, Texas and Indiana have held to the "four 
comers" rule in the face of change, limiting the duty of defense to cases in which the 
complaint pleads a covered injury. Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Comprehensive Health 
Care Ass'n, Inc., 2 F.3d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1993); Transamerica Ins. Servs. v. Kopko, 570 
N.E.2d 1283, 1285 (Ind. 1991) (rejecting the liberal test adopted by the court of ap­
peals). In contrast, California has adopted the more liberal test, construing the duty to 
defend to be implicated when either the facts alleged in the complaint or extrinsic facts 
raise the potential that the complaint might later be amended to seek recovery for a 
covered injury. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 177 (Cal. 1966) (The duty to 
defend is based on the "facts which the insurer learns from the complaint, the insured, 
or other sources. An insurer, therefore bears a duty to defend its insured whenever it 
ascertains facts which give rise to the potential of liability under the policy."). 
34. SL Indus., Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1266, 1272 (N.J. 
1992). One commentator notes that this rule "is sensible: an insurer should not be 
allowed to escape its obligations by ignoring true facts, simply because the plaintiff 
failed to allege them." JERRY, supra note 29, at 563. See, e.g., American Guar. and 
Liab. Ins. Co. v. Vista Medical Supply, 699 F. Supp. 787, 794 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (duty to 
defend is triggered when employee alleges in her declaration in support of the com­
plaint that the employer made false statements to humiliate her, although the complaint 
does not allege facts giving rise to potential liability for defamation). The liberal rule is 
required in states that have adopted notice pleading, since the complaint in these juris­
dictions is an unreliable gauge of the facts forming the basis of the plaintiffs claims. 
Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 621 N.E.2d 796, 798 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). Of 
course, the "liberal" rule might work in the insurer's favor if the complaint potentially 
triggers coverage, but the facts surrounding the matter establish that no coverage under 
the policy in fact is triggered. See, e.g., Northern Ins. Co. of New York v. Morgan, Nos. 
1 CA-CV 92-0020, 1 CA-CV 92-0553,1995 WL 564722 at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 26, 
1995) (holding that the insurer had no duty to defend because the sexual conduct in 
question either was intentional and excluded from coverage or was consensual and 
therefore nonactionable, regardless of the phrasing of the allegations in the complaint). 
35. Compare Ellis v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 619 So. 2d 1130 (La. Ct. App. 
1993) (wrongful discharge claim premised on retaliation for assertion of FLSA rights 
triggered the duty to defend because the retaliatory actions pleaded in the complaint 
included invasions of privacy, humiliation and discrimination) with French Cleaners, 
Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., No. CV 92-0518285, 1995 WL 91423, at *4 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 1995) (no coverage for age discrimination claim that alleged no 
defamatory statements by the employer that caused injury: "A different question might 
have been presented if [the employee] had sought damages for injury to her profes­
sional reputation as a result of [the employer's] allegedly discriminatory treatment of 
her on account of her age."). 
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It is universally acknowledged that the duty to defend is 
broader than the duty to pay losses under the policy. This is true in 
a very obvious sense, given that the insurer promises to defend any 
suit alleging damages covered by the policy, whereas the insurer 
will not have to pay any sums if the employer prevails in the litiga­
tion.36 The breadth of the duty to defend is more expansive than 
the duty to pay in other important respects as well. First, the gen­
eral rule is that a complaint that raises one -claim within the policy 
coverage generally triggers a duty to defend the insured against all 
claims asserted in the complaint, due to the difficulty of bifurcating 
control over the litigation or of later apportioning the costs when 
the case involves a number of interlocking and overlapping 
claims.37 ~oreover, the policy provides that the duty to defend ter­
36. In California, which has adopted the extrinsic facts test of the duty to defend, 
the rule is summarized as follows: 
The duty to defend arises as long as the facts (either expressed or implied in 
the third party's complaint, or as learned from other sources) give rise to a 
potentially covered claim, even though the insurer's investigation produces 
facts showing the claim is baseless. It is the insurer's duty to prove the allega­
tions false. 
Devin v. United Servo Auto. Ass'n, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 268 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (cita­
tions omitted). See also City of Old Town v. American Employers Ins. Co., 858 F. 
Supp. 264, 269 (D. Me. 1994); Intermountain Gas Co. v. Industrial Indemn. Co., 868 
P.2d 510, 513 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994). 
37. See, e.g., Vienna Family Medical Assoc., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 872 F. Supp. 
1509 (S.D. W. Va. 1995) (insurer had duty to defend seven count complaint brought by 
former employee, although many of the asserted claims did not fall within the coverage 
provisions); Wong v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1993) ("If a complaint states several possible theories of recovery, the insurer must 
defend the entire claim unless and until the insurer is able to limit the complaint to 
theories for which it has provided no insurance."); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Hartford Ins. 
Co., 621 N.E.2d 796, 800 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). But see Great American, 621 N.E.2d at 
801-02 (Ford, P.]., dissenting) (arguing that the court should more strictly assess 
whether covered and non-covered claims arise from the same occurrence); SL Indus­
tries, 607 A.2d at 1280 (holding· that the duty to defend arises only with respect to 
covered claims and rejecting the majority rule presuming that these costs cannot be 
apportioned between insurer and insured). 
A collateral effect of broadly construing the duty to defend in this way is to raise a 
significant conflict of interest between the insurer conducting the litigation and the em­
ployer/defendant. Because the insurer will only be obliged to pay covered damages 
awarded in the suit, it has a financial interest in ensuring that a verdict will be more 
heavily weighted toward non-covered claims. Given this conflict, states adopt a variety 
of responses, including: allowing the insured to select the defense counsel, requiring the 
insurer to reimburse the employer's counsel to monitor the litigation, or simply ignoring 
the potential for conflict altogether. Eric M. Holmes, A Conflicts-of-Interest Roadmap 
for Insurance Defense Counsel: Walking an Ethical Tightrope Without a Net, 26 WIL· 
LAMEITE L. REv. 1 (1989); Todd R. Smyth, Annotation, Duty of Insured to Pay for 
Independent Counsel When Conflict of Interest Exists Between Insured and Insurer, 50 
A.L.R. 4TH 932 (1986 & Supp. 1994). 
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minates when the policy limit has been exhausted "in the payment 
of judgments or settlements," and so many courts hold that the in­
surer cannot refuse to provide a defense in ongoing litigation even 
if it has agreed to pay the policy limits into court to be applied 
against the eventual judgment or settlement.38 Finally, as analyzed 
in the next section of this article, courts have employed the doctrine 
of reasonable expectations to expand the duty to defend. 
Wrongfully refusing to provide a defense is a breach of con­
tract by the insurer. In subsequent coverage litigation, the em­
ployer is entitled to reimbursement of its defense expenditures, in 
addition to indemnification for covered judgments or settlements. 
Additionally, the employer may be entitled to recover the attor­
neys' fees and costs incurred in securing this reimburs.ement.39 
Many jurisdictions hold that an insurer that wrongfully refuses to 
provide a defense will be "estopped from raising noncoverage as a 
defense under the indemnity provisions of the policy."40 This rem­
edy potentially is significant, since the duty to defend is broader 
than the duty to indemnify. Consequently, if an insurer has a duty 
to defend an employer, but the litigation ultimately establishes that 
the employer is liable only for non-covered events, an insurer that 
fails to provide the defense will be required to reimburse the em­
ployer notwithstanding the absence of a covered occurrence. Addi­
tionally, if the employer resolves the matter by settlement, this 
same logic leads some courts to preclude the insurer from challeng­
ing the amount of the settlement or attempting to allocate it among 
covered and non-covered claims.41 Consequently, a prudent insurer 
will either assume the defense under a reservation of rights to later 
deny coverage and seek reimbursement or will seek a declaratory 
judgment of its obligations immediately.42 Finally, some courts 
have extended the "bad faith" analysis to apply to the insurer's re­
38. JERRY, supra note 29 at 574-75. Cf. Ellis, 619 So. 2d 1130 (holding that CGL 
and umbrella carriers who refused to defend an action where some of the allegations 
potentially came within the policy coverage were liable for the attorney fees expended 
by the insured and the settlement paid to the employee, subject to the trial court's 
assessment of the reasonableness of those sums). 
39. See, e.g., Jostens, Inc. v. Mission Ins. Co., 387 N.W.2d 161, 168 (Minn. 1986). 
40. Society of Mount Carmel v. National Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 643 N.E.2d 1280, 
1292 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (noting the congruity of Illinois and California law on this 
point). 
41. JERRY, supra note 29, at 579-84. 
42. For an example of a case where the insurance company gambled and won, see 
Zack Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 93-7015, 1995 WL 33135, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 25, 
1995) (insured argued that failure of insurer to seek declaratory judgment or to provide 
a defense under a reservation of rights estopped the insurer from denying coverage; 
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fusal to provide a defense, presumably on the ground that even the 
foregoing remedies may be insufficient to prevent the insurance 
company from strategically refusing to expend large amounts in de­
fense costs until forced to do so by an employer who brings suit.43 
The burden of the duty to defend is accepted by insurers in 
order to obtain the extremely valuable right to control the litigation 
and disposition of the underlying claim. This control is crucial in 
the employment litigation setting, since emotions often run high. 
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
held that a law firm could not prevent its liability insurer from set­
tling a hostile environment and sexual harassment suit.44 Although 
the firm argued that the litigation was groundless and that settling 
the suit would injure its reputation, and also that the settlement 
would preclude it from pursuing a later suit for malicious prosecu­
tion, the court permitted the insurer to settle with the plaintiff 
based on the clear provisions in the policy.45 As the court noted, an 
employer wishing to retain control over settlement of cases (as 
many professionals choose to do in their malpractice policies) must 
purchase a policy that affords this right.46 
however, the court found that complaint filed by insured's employee did not trigger the 
duty to defend, thereby relieving insurer of any obligations}. 
43. See, e.g., TIbbs v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 755 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirming 
an award of $600,000 punitive damages for breach of the duty to defend); State Farm 
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Price, 684 P.2d 524, 532 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984) (remanding case to 
determine whether the insurer's breach of the duty to defend amounted to closing its 
eyes to the facts a.nd acting in bad faith). 
In the employment setting, it appears likely that an insurer's denial of coverage will 
be premised on a good faith objection to the insured's reading of the policy, given the 
sharply contested legal issues involved. See, e.g., Vienna Family Medical Assoc., Inc. v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 872 F. Supp. 1509, 1514 (S.D.W. Va. 1995); Clark-Peterson Co. Inc. v. 
Independent Ins. Assoc., Ltd., 514 N.W.2d 912,916 (Iowa 1994): 
Defendants were not overly litigious, they merely believed no coverage ex­
isted under the policy, a contention with which we initially agreed. Once a 
final determination was made, the defendants promptly paid the entire claim. 
Even prior to this, [the insurer] paid attorney fees in the underlying defense 
and paid half the judgment at the termination of trial, reserving the right to 
reclaim the fees and portion of the judgment paid. With this degree of cooper­
ation it cannot be said that defendants were overly litigious .... The coverage 
was reasonably debatable in view of our final determination. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
44. Caplan v. Fellheimer Eichen Braverman & Kaskey, 68 F.3d '828 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
45. Id. at 839. 
46. Id. at 839-40 ("It is not appropriate for us to amend the policy here in order to 
give [the insured] a type of coverage for which it didn't contract."). 
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III. INTERPRETING THE INSURANCE CONTRACT 
Coverage is determined not only by interpreting the terms of 
the insurance contract as written, but also by applying judicially­
created doctrines that may expand the insured's rights beyond a 
strict reading of the policy language. As one leading commentator 
has summarized, "mudges in insurance cases not only make insur­
ance law; sometimes they also make insurance."47 Conversely, 
courts will refuse to enforce an insured's rights under even an un­
ambiguous insurance policy if such enforcement would violate pub­
lic policy. In such a case, it is appropriate to say that sometimes 
judges also "unmake" insurance. In this section of the Article, I 
provide a basic overview of these two key principles that govern 
interpretation of the terms of an insurance contract. 
A. 	 From Contra Proferentem to Reasonable Expectations: 
Judge-Made Insurance 
If a written contract contains an ambiguity, it is a well-settled 
maxim that the courts generally will prefer the interpretation favor­
ing the party who did not draft the language in question.48 
Although not limited to cases involving adhesion contracts, the 
maxim contra proferentem is followed more rigorously when a sig­
nificant disparity of bargaining power exists between the parties, 
and the stronger party supplies all of the terms of the written con­
tract. This, of course, is the situation in the typical insurance trans­
action, even in the case when a business entity is purchasing 
commercial insurance.49 Consequently, an employer asserting cov­
erage should prevail if it is able to demonstrate that one reasonable 
reading of the policy provides coverage, even if the employer's in­
terpretation is not the only, or even the most, reasonable manner in 
which to construe the policy language.5o This rule of interpretation 
47. 	 ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 10l. 
48. The maxim, omnia praesumuntur contra pro!erentem, is widely cited and is 
embodied in REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 206 (1981). 
49. Of course, very large commercial entities (including, of course, insurance 
companies) are sometimes able to negotiate insurance coverage in a manner that more 
closely resembles contract negotiation between two parties having equal competence, 
expertise, and bargaining power. See, e.g., Falmouth Nat'l Bank v. TIcor TItle Ins. Co., 
920 F.2d 1058, 1061-62 (1st Cir. 1990) (general rules of construction regarding insurance 
policies do not apply to a case involving a sophisticated insured that had negotiated 
specific terms in the policy tailored to a particular lawsuit). 
50. "There are literally thousands of judicial opinions resolving insurance cover­
age disputes in favor of claimants on the basis that a provision of the insurance policy at 
issue was ambiguous and therefore should be construed against the insurer." KEETON 
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provides one of the justifications for the universal judicial practice 
of reading coverage provisions broadly and exclusions narrowly. 
Twenty-five years ago, however, commentators began to recog­
nize that the courts were interpreting insurance contracts in a man­
ner that could not be explained solely by the maxim contra 
proferentem. In a path breaking article, then Professor Robert 
Keeton articulated the "doctrine of reasonable expectations" to ex­
plain the interpretive approach increasingly taken by courts since 
the early 1960s.51 Judge Keeton summarizes the doctrine in his 
treatise as follows: "In general, courts will protect the reasonable 
expectations of applicants, insureds, and intended beneficiaries re­
garding the coverage afforded by insurance contracts even though a 
careful examination of the policy provisions indicates that such ex­
pectations are contrary to the expressed intention of the insurer."52 
& WIDISS, supra note 9, at § 6.3(a)(2). See, e.g., Western Heritage Ins. Co. v. Magic 
Years Learning Ctr. and Child Care, Inc., 45 F.3d 85, 88 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that a 
. policy provides coverage for a claim of sexual harassment when a "physical abuse" cov­
erage endorsement renders later exclusions ambiguous, since the court must adopt the 
construction of the policy urged by the insured so long as it is not unreasonable); Trust­
ees, Missoula County Sch. Dist. No.1 v. Pacific Employer's Ins. Co., 866 P.2d 1118, 
1124 (Mont. 1993) (holding that a policy exclusion of damages paid for sums owed 
pursuant to a contract was ambiguous with regard to the employee's statutory claims 
for bad faith termination and recovery of lost wages and must be read in favor of the 
employer). 
51. Robert Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 
HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970). 
52. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 9, § 6.3(a)(3). For commentary on the doc­
trine, see Laurie Kindel Fett, Note, The Reasonable Expectations Doctrine: An Alterna­
tive to Bending and Stretching Traditional Tools of Contract Interpretation, 18 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REv. 1113 (1992) (student note exploring the doctrine under Minnesota 
law); Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law 
After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823 (1990) (providing a detailed historical account 
of the doctrine and asserting that the doctrine is principled and can be applied within 
justiciable guidelines); Stephen J. Ware, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doc­
trine, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1461 (1989) (student note providing a "law and economics" 
critique of the doctrine); Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 
CONN. L. REv. 323, 392 (1986) (arguing for refinements to the doctrine in response to 
the fading appeal that the doctrine holds for courts and commentators and contending 
that courts should "discard their unfortunate tendency to speak the platitudes of rea­
sonable expectations without undertaking a careful and systematic analysis"); William 
A. Mayhew, Reasonable Expectations: Seeking a Principled Application, 13 PEPP. L. 
REv. 267, 287-96 (1986) (formulating standards for applying the doctrine); Scott B. 
Krider, The Reconstruction of Insurance Contracts Under the Doctrine of Reasonable 
Expectations, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 155 (1984) (student note arguing that regulatory 
efforts address the underlying problems in the insurance industry in a manner superior 
to judicial use of reasonable expectations); William Mark Lashner, A Common Law 
Alternative to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in the Construction of Insurance 
Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1175, 1208 (1982) (student note arguing that "any provi­
sion which undercuts the bargained-for insurance coverage must [bel specifically ex­
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In other words, even when the policy language unambiguously pre­
cludes coverage, under certain circumstances courts will hold that 
coverage exists.53 
Professor Abraham has organized the "reasonable expecta­
tions" line of cases in a persuasive manner by suggesting that there 
are two distinct applications of the doctrine.54 In "misleading im­
pression" cases, the courts find that the insurer has in some manner 
influenced the insured to believe that coverage exists despite the 
precise terms of the policy. These cases represent a logical exten­
sion of the maxim contra proferentem by acknowledging that in 
some instances it may be unjust to enforce even unambiguous pol­
iey terms, given the nature of the bargaining process and relative 
bargaining strength of the parties.55 In "mandated coverage" cases, 
by contrast, the courts determine that coverage is desirable and will 
be imposed despite the policy terms in order to effectuate a general 
goal of broader risk spreading. These latter cases stand "as criti­
cism of the insurance market as a whole," rather than an indictment 
of the insurer for misleading behavior and are best regarded as judi­
plained to the insured" to be enforceable); Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and 
Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. 
REv. 1151 (1981) (article that served as the basis for the book chapter discussed in the 
text accompanying infra notes 54-56). 
53. Courts traditionally invoke contra proferentem with the caveat that the doc­
trine is not a license for courts to rewrite the insurance contract between the parties. 
See, e.g., Lapeka, Inc. v. Security Nat'\. Ins. Co., 814 F. Supp. 1540, 1545 (D. Kan. 1993) 
(A court may not "torture words in order to import ambiguity" into the policy, nor may 
the court "make another contract for the parties. Its function is to enforce the contract 
as made."). The doctrine of reasonable expectations breaks with this traditionallimita­
tion on the scope of contract interpretation. As Professor Henderson correctly states, 
decisions that rely on the doctrine of reasonable expectations "solely to construe policy 
language do not support a new principle at all.... The doctrine of reasonable expecta­
tions, if it involves a new principle at all, may apply without regard to any ambiguity. It 
may affect the substantive provisions of the policy, regardless of how the policy is 
drafted." Henderson, supra note 52, at 827. 
54. ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 104. 
55. Judge Keeton lists five "pragmatic reasons why coverage limitations that con­
flict with reasonable expectations ought not to be enforced even when the limitations 
are both explicit and unambiguous in policy forms," all of which support the "mislead­
ing impression" cases. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 9, at § 6.3(a)(4). The reasons 
offered are: (1) insurance contracts are complex documents that the average insured 
finds difficult to understand, (2) the insured receives a copy of the policy only after 
purchasing it, when the motivation to read the policy is minimal, (3) the insurer is able 
to exercise its expertise and superior bargaining power by inserting specific limitations 
in the policy that work an unconscionable advantage over the insured, (4) general mar­
keting techniques engender expectations of comprehensive coverage, and (5) the insur­
ance policy is titled and structured to emphasize coverage and downplay exclusions. Id. 
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cial creation of insurance.56 
1. "Misleading Impression" Cases 
Clark-Peterson Co., Inc. v. Independent Insurance Associates, 
Ltd. 57 provides a good example of a court using the "misleading 
impression" application of the doctrine of reasonable expectations. 
Clark-Peterson suffered a substantial judgment in a suit brought by 
an employee alleging a discriminatory termination on the basis of 
his alcoholism. The policy provided coverage for "[p]ersonal 
[i]njury," defined to include "[d]iscrimination or humiliation;" how­
ever, the policy also limited this coverage to accidents which unin­
tentionally cause such injury and later in the policy excluded 
liability for discrimination "committed by or at [Clark-Peterson's] 
direction."58 The Iowa Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's 
finding that the employee's suit was "not covered under the precise 
wording of the policy," since the discriminatory termination in this 
case was an intentional act committed by Clark-Peterson.59 Never­
theless, the court found that the insurer must provide coverage on 
the basis of the reasonable expectations doctrine. 
In order to invoke the reasonable expectations doctrine under 
Iowa law, an employer must first demonstrate either that the policy 
is "such that an ordinary layperson would misunderstand its cover­
age" or that the employer's coverage expectations were fostered by 
"circumstances attributable to the insurer."6o The court found that 
the ordinary layperson could reasonably expect coverage for such 
"an unusual and controversial liability, liability which no doubt 
came as a shock" to Clark-Peterson, given that the policy provided 
coverage for personal injury resulting from discrimination.61 The 
court distinguished intentional racial or sexual discrimination-con­
duct as to which no reasonable employer could expect coverage­
from intentional discrimination on the basis of alcoholism, the con­
duct giving rise to liability in this case.62 
Nevertheless, the court emphasized that the doctrine is limited 
56. ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 109. 
57. 492 N.W.2d 675 (Iowa 1992) (en bane). 
58. Id. at 676 n.3. 
59. Id. at 677. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 678. 
62. The court expressed some sympathy for an employer who may have bona fide 
business reasons to fire an alcoholic employee, albeit illegal and discriminatory reasons. 
Id. at 678 n.6. 
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in scope, to the extent that bare reasonable expectations of cover­
age are not sufficient in themselves to override policy terms. 
Although acknowledging that the reasonable expectations doctrine 
"has become a vital part of our law interpreting insurance policies," 
the court stressed that the doctrine "does not contemplate the ex­
pansion of insurance coverage on a general equitable basis. The 
doctrine is carefully circumscribed; it can only be invoked where an 
exclusion '(1) is bizarre or oppressive, (2) eviscerates terms explic­
itly agreed to, or (3) eliminates the dominant purpose of the trans­
action."'63 The court held that the clear grant of coverage for 
claims relating to injuries resulting from discriIpination was later 
eviscerated, even if not eliminated entirely, by other sections of the 
policy. Thus, Clark-Peterson was able to satisfy the second test. 
The court's rationale unambiguously was premised on the quasi­
deceptive (even if benign) structure of the policy and the difference 
in expertise and bargaining power between the parties. 
To deny discrimination coverage in the present case would be to 
withdraw with the policy's left hand what is given with its right. 
In a fundamental sense, of course, this is the proper function of 
any exclusion clause in an insurance policy. The reasonable ex­
pectations doctrine does no violence to this proper function by its 
limited intrusion into it. The doctrine means only that when, 
within its metes and bounds definition, an exclusion acts in tech­
nical ways to withdraw a promised coverage, it must do so forth­
rightly, with words that are, if not flashing, at least sufficient to 
assure that a reasonable policy purchaser will not be caught 
unawares. 
The reasonable expectations doctrine is a recognition that 
insurance policies are sold on the basis of the coverage they 
63. Id. at 677 (quoting Aid (Mutual) Ins. v. Steffen, 423 N.W.2d 189, 192 (1988)). 
The "misleading impression" cases probably encompass the more extreme cases in 
which an insured argues that the policy is "unconscionable" or provides "illusory cover­
age" for the premium charged. In Clark-Peterson, the court applied a test that sensibly 
combined the interest in upholding reasonable expectations with the interest in preclud­
ing the insurer from obtaining unconscionable advantages. Professor Keeton suggests 
that in order to avoid 
claims based on either reasonable expectations or unconscionability, the in­
surer should be required to adopt measures which guarantee (1) either that 
the purchaser has actual expectations consistent with described coverage be­
cause the purchaser was made aware of the limitations during the marketing 
transaction, or that it would be unreasonable for an insured to have expecta­
tions that are not consistent with the insurance policy provisions, and (2) that 
the premium charged appropriately reflects the actual scope of risk that the 
policy provisions define. 
KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 9, at 641-42. 
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promise. When later exclusions work to eat up all, or even sub­
stantially all, of a vital coverage, they cannot rest on technical 
wording, obscure to the average insurance purchaser. At some 
point fairness demands that the coverage clause itself be self­
limiting.64 
Although the court rejected a purely equitable approach, the "fair­
ness" of extending coverage beyond the policy terms was premised 
on the court's belief that the insurer engendered reasonable expec­
tations with its policy format. 
It is useful to compare Clark-Peterson with fostens, Inc. v. 
Northfield Insurance CO.65 In fostens, the Minnesota Court of Ap­
peals rejected the employer's argument that coverage should be af­
forded under the doctrine of reasonable expectations, based on its 
finding that the discrimination "coverage" provided by the um­
brella policy was effectively negated immediately in the insuring 
agreement itself. The fostens court held that the employer could 
have no reasonable expectation of coverage for discriminatory em­
ployment practices arising from the insurance market generally, nor 
from the terms of the policy, since the exclusionary language was 
included as part of the definition of "discrimination" in the insuring 
provision.66 In short, the court -refused to create insurance since the 
insurer did not contribute to any mistaken beliefs that an employer 
64. Clark-Peterson, 492 N.W.2d at 679. 
65. 527 N.W.2d 116 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). 
66. [W]e believe that the policy's "except for" language immediately negated 
any legitimate expectation engendered. Jostens could not have been under 
more than a momentary delusion that the policy afforded coverage for the 
costs at issue, given the juxtaposition of the exclusions to the policy's mention 
of discrimination; thus, the reasonable expectations doctrine does not provide 
coverage. 
Id. at 118. The court also rejected the separate claim by the employer that the policy 
provided only illusory coverage for discrimination, holding that "the doctrine of illusory 
coverage is best applied ... where part of the premium is specifically allocated to a 
particular type or period of coverage and that coverage turns out to be functionally 
nonexistent," or where the employer reasonably believes that "some specific part of its 
premium was allocated to discrimination coverage." Id. at 119. Because Jostens did 
not pay a separate premium for the extremely limited discrimination coverage and be­
cause the limited nature of the coverage was expressed in a manner that defeated any 
reasonable expectations that Jostens might hold to the contrary, the policy terms were 
enforced as written. Cf Fidelity and Ouar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Everett I. Brown 
Co., 25 F.3d 484, 490 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that the Indiana law of "illusory cover­
age"-Iimited to cases where a premium was paid for coverage that will not provide 
benefits under any set of reasonably expected circumstances~is inapplicable when the 
employer is covered for many potential claims under the terms of the policy); Wayne 
Township Bd. of School Comm. v. Indiana Ins. Co., 650 N.E.2d 1205, 1212 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1995). 
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reasonably could have held about the scope of coverage under the 
umbrella policy. 
The "misleading impression" application of the reasonable ex­
pectations doctrine provides. employers with a powerful tool to 
avoid a strict reading of the policy terms, but this theory is not un- . 
bounded. If the policy language and marketing techniques em­
ployed by the insurer scrupulously avoid engendering expectations 
on the part of the reasonable employer that the dispute in question 
is covered by the policy, then the insurance contract most likely will 
be enforced as written. 
2. Mandated Coverage Cases 
A more dramatic application of the reasonable expectations 
doctrine occurs when the court finds coverage despite the absence 
of any misleading conduct attributable to the insurer. Professor 
Abraham contends that the tremendous expansion of the insurer's 
duty to provide a legal defense to the insured is an example of the 
"mandated coverage" application of the doctrine of reasonable ex­
pectations.67 The California courts recently struggled with the 
"mandated coverage" application of the reasonable expectations 
doctrine in a series of cases that determined the scope of the duty to 
defend provision in workers' compensation policies. In recent 
years, the California Supreme Court has held that civil claims for 
injuries resulting from the termination of employment, including 
emotional distress that does not result in a physical disability, are 
preempted by the exclusive remedy provided under workers' com­
pensation law.68 On the basis of these cases, the California Court of 
Appeal decided that when an employee sues for wrongful discharge 
and claims damages for emotional distress caused by the termina­
tion, the employer is entitled to a defense of the civil action by its 
workers' compensation carrier. The court reasoned that the em­
ployer "could reasonably have expected [the insurer] to asse·rt the 
bar of workers' compensation as an affirmative defense in the. un­
derlying case."69 Because it is questionable that a reasonable em­
ployer would expect its workers' compensation carrier to defend a 
67. Abraham discusses the seminal case in this area, Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 
P.2d 168 (Cal. 1966). ABRAHAM, supra note to, at 110-12. 
68. Livitsanos v. Superior Court, 828 P.2d 1195 (Cal. 1992); Shoemaker v. Myers, 
801 P.2d 1054 (Cal. 1990). 
69. Wong v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 6 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1993), overruled by La Jolla Beach and Tennis Club, Inc. v. Industrial Indemnity Co., 36 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 100, 884 P.2d 1048 (Cal. 1995) (en banc). 
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civil suit in which the employee makes no claim for benefits under 
the workers' compensation laws, this case is best understood as 
mandating a specific kind of coverage not otherwise available in the 
insurance market: protection against the costs of defending claims 
in civil suits that seek recovery for injuries compensable only under 
the workers' compensation statutes.7° Needless to say, this case 
represented a dramatic expansion of the duty to defend provision in 
the Workers' Compensation Policy. 
The scope of the duty to defend under a workers' compensa­
tion policy was finally resolved by the California Supreme Court in 
La lolla Beach and Tennis Club, Inc. v. Industrial Indemnity Co. 71 
An employee of La Jolla filed suit alleging a racially discriminatory 
termination that also amounted to an intentional infliction of emo­
tiortal distress. La Jolla tendered defense of the case to its workers' 
compensation carrier, which refused to defend the action. La Jolla 
pleaded the exclusivity of the workers' compensation remedy as an 
affirmative defense, settled the lawsuit with its employee before the 
issues were adjudicated, and then sought recovery from its insurer 
for breach of its duty to defend and for indemnification. The trial 
court entered summary judgment for the insurer, but the court of 
appeal reversed this judgment and found that the employer was en­
titled to a defense.72 The court expressed its reluctance to impose 
additional burdens on the workers' compensation system, but nev­
ertheless found that the "wide-ranging obligation" of the duty to 
defend compelled the result it reached since the claimed injury of 
emotional distress "had the potential of coming within the scope of 
the Workers' Compensation Act [and] this potential would in turn 
give rise to a duty to defend. "73 The court reasoned that if the em­
ployer successfully established that it did not discriminate against 
its employee, but the employee nevertheless established that he suf­
fered emotional distress as a result of the termination, the em­
ployee's suit eventually would be reduced to a claim for benefits 
under the workers' compensation statutes. Thus, the civil action 
raised the potential that the employee ultimately would be asserting 
a claim for benefits that would be covered under the workers' com­
pensationinsurance policy.74 
70. Cf ABRAHAM, supra note 10, at 111. 
71. 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 656 (Cal. ct. App. 1994), rev'd, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 100,884 P.2d 
1048 (Cal. 1995) (en bane). 
72. Id. 
73. La Jolla, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 659, 661 (relying on Wong, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 1.). 
74. Id. at 662. 
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The California Supreme Court, en banc, reversed the court of 
appeal and found that no duty to defend existed on these facts. In 
its opinion the court quite clearly distinguished the different appli­
c~tions of. the reasonable expectations doctrine regarding an in­
surer's duty to defend. First, the court acknowledged as a general 
matter that the reasonable expectations of the insured will be 
respected when the policy is "ambiguous" due to the language used 
or its placement in the pOlicy.75 The court found that the policy 
unambiguously promised only to defend any claim, proceeding, or 
suit for benefits under the workers" compensation law and that the 
underlying suit did not seek such benefits.76 In short, the court 
found that the case did not fall within the "misleading impression" 
application of the doctrine of reasonable expectations. 
However, the employer explicitly urged the court to employ a 
broader test of reasonable expectations by arguing that employers 
who purchase liability insurance packages (including CGL and 
workers' compensation policies) are entitled to receive the "seam­
less insurance protection" that they reasonably expect.77 This more 
expansive claim amounts to a request that the courts mandate cov­
erage to "fill the gaps" in the insurance package, an invitation that 
the supreme court refused in this case. The court found that the 
employer could not reasonably expect seamless coverage, especially 
since, by purchasing several different policies, the employer mani­
fested its understanding that each policy was limited in scope.78 
The court further found that the underlying suit raised no potential 
for a covered judgment, since workers' compensation benefits may 
be awarded only through the administrative process established by 
the workers' compensation law. To hold otherwise, the court rea­
soned, would amount to converting the duty to defend in a workers' 
compensation policy into an unlimited litigation insurance policy. 
There is always some possibility that facts alleged in one forum 
could, in the future, form the basis for a covered claim in a differ­
ent action. Were this the test, however, any judicial or adminis­
trative action involving an employer-employee relationship could 
be characterized as a "predecessor" claim for workers' compen­
sation benefits. 
75. La Jolla Beach and Tennis Oub, Inc. v. Industrial Indem. Co., 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
100, 106, 884 P.2d 1048, 1054 (Cal. 1995). 
76. Id. at 108-09, 884 P.2d at 1056-57. 
77. Id. at 109, 884 P.2d at 1057. 
78. Id. 
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Rather, the test is whether the underlying action for which 
defense and indemnity is sought potentially seeks relief within the 
coverage of the policy .... Thus, the Court of Appeal fundamen­
tally misconstrued the kind of potential coverage that gives rise 
to a duty to defend when it concluded that [the insurer] had a 
duty to defend the civil action merely because [the employee] 
might, at some indeterminate time in the future, file a workers' 
compensation claim that did fall within [the insurer's] coverage.79 
In short, the supreme court rejected the "mandated coverage" ap­
plication of the reasonable expectations doctrine on the facts of the 
La lolla case. 
Nevertheless, it remains the case that the broad duty to defend 
under California law is premised on precisely the rationale that the 
supreme court rejected in La lolla: that the substance of the claims, 
and not a third party claimant's erroneous pleading, should deter­
mine the scope of the duty.sO The opinion of the court of appeal in 
La lolla, then, appears to apply the reasonable expectations doc­
trine more consistently with the precedents and might be followed 
in other jurisdictions willing to accept the far-reaching ramifications 
of the "mandated coverage" application of the doctrine of reason­
able expectations. The supreme court reversal probably represents 
the judgment that the harsh reality of the business and insurance 
environment in California should override the extension of reason­
able expectations doctrine, which is to say that the court declined to 
mandate litigation coverage in a situation where to do so would 
79. Id. at 110, 884 P.2d at 1058. 
80. The court claimed to follow the analysis set out in the seminal duty to defend 
case, Gray v. Zurich Ins: Co., 419 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1966), but there is no easy reconcilia­
tion of the two cases. In Gray, the insured was sued for maliciously and intentionally 
assaulting the plaintiff, and eventually suffered a plaintiff's jury verdict and an award of 
damages. Injuries to third persons resulting from the insured's intentional acts were not 
within the scope of coverage of the liability policy. However, the court held that the 
insurer breached its duty to defend, since the plaintiff "could have amended his com­
plaint to allege merely negligent conduct," thereby triggering potential coverage under 
the policy. Id. at 177. There seems to be no principled basis for distinguishing between 
the possibility that a plaintiff might amend a civil claim in light of the insured's antici­
pated defense and the possibility that a plaintiff might withdraw a civil claim and refile 
it as a claim for workers' compensation benefits in light of the employer's defense to the 
claim. More importantly, if the employer's claim is in fact subject to the exclusive juris­
diction of the workers' compensation system, it appears only reasonable for an em­
ployer to expect its insurance carrier to secure a dismissal of the improperly filed civil 
action (or certain counts in the complaint) and to protect the employer's interests in the 
worker's compensation forum with respect to such claims. For this reason, La Jolla is 
perhaps best read as a decision by the court that it will not mandate litigation coverage 
. when to do so would place enormous strains on the already overburdened workers' 
compensation system. . 
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cause more harm than good. Despite this apparent resolution, 
there most certainly will be additional litigation in California re­
garding an employer's ability to secure a defense from its liability 
carriers for employment litigation, especially since the La lolla 
court was careful to limit its analysis to the duty to defend under 
the workers' compensation portion of the policy and was also care­
ful ~ot to decide the scope of the duty to defend under the em­
ployer's liability portion of the policy.81 
The doctrine of reasonable expectations is vitally important to 
employers seeking coverage for employment litigation, since a 
painstaking review of the specific language of many liability policies 
will suggest that coverage is not afforded for many liabilities arising 
out of employment-related practices. However, it would be a mis­
take to conclude that courts will lightly disregard policy terms, and 
so it is important for the employment lawyer to determine which 
application of the reasonable expectations doctrine fits with the 
facts of the case, thereby serving her client's needs, and to assist the 
client in developing a strategy for invoking the doctrine 
persuasively. 
B. Public Policy as a Limitation on Promised Coverage 
It is well established that courts will not enforce contracts that 
are contrary to public policy, regardless of the clarity with which the 
parties have expressed their intentions to be bound.82 Insurance 
contracts are subject to this general rule no less than other con­
tracts.83 This limitation on the parties' freedom to contract is pre­
mised on the fact that a contract is never entirely a private matter, 
especially if the contract is a liability insurance policy. By defini­
tion, a contract of liability insurance affects the injured third party 
seeking compensation from the insured by providing a source of 
funds to satisfy a judgment. Obviously, there is a strong public pol­
icy in favor of ensuring that injured parties are compensated to the 
fullest extent possible. The contract might also affect other persons, 
however, if the existence of insurance encourages the insured to 
81. La Jolla, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103, 884 P.2d at 1048. If Gray remains good law, 
these arguments should prove persuasive, since the result in La Jolla is premised on the 
forum in which the complaint was filed. Liability policies other than the workers' com­
pensation policy, of course, provide coverage for damages awarded in civil suits within 
the terms of the policy. 
82. RESTATEMENT (SECONO) OF CoNTRACTS § 178 (1979); E. ALLEN FARNS· 
WORTIi, CoNTRACTS §§ 5.1-5.9 (2d ed. 1990). 
83. CoUCH ON INSURANCE 20 (rev. ed.) § 39:14 (Mark S. Rhodes, ed. 1985). 
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harm others intentionally by absolving the insured of financial ac­
countability.84 It is equally obvious that there is a strong public pol­
icy in favor of reducing injurious behavior and requiring that 
certain wrongdoers bear the full consequences of their actions. 
The public policy defense, when used as a limitation on prom­
ised coverage in an insurance policy, amounts to a decision that the 
former public policy is outweighed by the latter on the facts of a 
particular case. Thus, courts deem certain claims to be uninsurable, 
despite the fact that this has the undesirable effect of eliminating a 
source of funds to satisfy any judgment obtained by an injured third 
party claimant. The general rule in this regard, known as the princi­
ple of "fortuity," is that "a contract of insurance to indemnify a 
person for damages resulting from his own intentional misconduCt 
is void as against public policy and courts will not enforce such a 
contract."85 If courts "make insurance" with the doctrine of reason­
able expectations, then they also "unmake insurance" with the pub­
lic policy limitation on enforcement. 
One of the earliest and most important developments in mod­
em employment law was judicial recognition of the tort of wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy.86 As stated in a leading case, 
"when an employer's discharge of an employee violates fundamen­
tal principles of public policy, the discharged employee may main­
tain a tort action and recover damages traditionally available in 
such actions."87 One might expect courts to prohibit an employer 
from enforcing any insurance coverage available for a wrongful dis­
charge claim, given that the underlying liability necessarily impli­
cates public policy. In Dixon Distribution Co. v. Hanover Insurance 
Co. ,88 the lllinois courts recently addressed this issue in a manner 
that clarifies the public policy defense to enforcement of insurance 
contracts and distinguishes this defense from the use of public pol­
84. Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club Inc., 549 So. 2d 1005, 1007 (Fla. 1989) 
("The rationale underlying [the public policy doctrine] is that the availability of insur­
ance will directly stimulate the intentional wrongdoer to violate the law."). Based upon 
this rationale, for example, courts will not permit a party to insure against liabilities it 
incurs by engaging in criminal conduct. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. 
Baer, 745 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. Cal. 1990), affd, 956 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1992). 
85. Dixon Distrib. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 641 N.E.2d 395, 401 (III. 1994). This 
public policy doctrine may be judicially acknowledged, or in some cases it is directly 
stated in legislation. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 1993) and MASS. GEN. L. ch. 
175, § 47 (1994). 
86. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, ET. AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW §§ 9.9-9.14 (1994). 
87. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 840, 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 
1980). 
88. 612 N.E.2d 846 (III. App. Ct. 1993), affd, 641 N.E.2d 395 (III. 1994). 
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icy as the gravamen of an employment tort. As explained in Dixon, 
although in some instances termination of employment will contra­
vene public policy, it is not necessarily the case that permitting the 
employer to utilize available insurance coverage will also violate 
public policy. 
In Dixon, the employer had been sued for willfully, intention­
ally, and wrongfully terminating an employee in retaliation for hav­
ing filed two workers' compensation claims. These allegations state 
a classic case of wrongful discharge, since public policy strongly dis­
favors permitting employers to use their economic power to inhibit 
employees from exercising their statutory rights. The trial court de­
termined that coverage for wrongful termination suits is precluded 
in the interests of public policy. Nevertheless, the appellate court 
reversed the summary judgment entered in favor of the insurer, 
holding that the tort claim fell within the coverage provision of the 
policy and that public policy did not bar enforcement of the insur­
ance contract.89 The appellate court reasoned that the availability 
of insurance coverage for wrongful discharge claims would benefit 
all parties and would not induce wrongful behavior. 
It may be more in the public's interest to allow businesses to pro­
tect themselves by insurance coverage against all the various 
forms of claims for discrimination, sexual harassment, and retali­
atory discharge than to allow businesses to become bankrupt in 
defending against several catastrophic suits. 
If insurance coverage somehow insulated employers from li­
ability and thereby made them more likely to fire employees in 
retaliation for asserting protected rights, then the public policy 
may favor a restriction of insurance on that basis. However ... 
[i]nsurance companies have the right to refuse to insure or to in­
crease their premiums, both of which may act as deterrents 
against retaliatory discharges by impetuous employers. 
89. The appellate court held that the tort of wrongful discharge was within the 
policy definition of "occurrence" because it did not necessarily involve an act commit­
ted with "actual malice." Dixon, 612 N.E.2d at 853 (contending that terminations in 
violation of public policy may be premised on business decisions rather than animus). 
The supreme court affirmed, noting that the tort of wrongful discharge required only a 
causal connection between the worker's compensation filings and the discharge, not 
actual malice against the employee. Dixon, 641 N.E.2d at 399. Moreover, the court 
noted that although punitive damages are available as a remedy in a suit for wrongful 
discharge upon a showing of actual malice, punitive damages are not a "necessary con­
sequence of the tort." Id. at 400. 
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Having a third party, with an economic interest to protect, 
oversee the actions of the employer could be very beneficial to 
the employee and society.90 
The supreme court reinforced this balancing test by emphasizing 
that public policy is implicated only when an employer seeks in­
demnification for injuries that it intended to inflict, and not when 
an employer seeks coverage for intentional actions that have re­
sulted in injuries.91 
The analysis in Dixon is persuasive, and should provide gui­
dance to other courts. The public policy against enforcing insur­
ance contracts should be triggered only when an insurance policy 
will indemnify an employer who intended to harm its employees 
with impunity in light of available coverage. Otherwise, the public 
policy in favor of making resources available to injured persons 
supports enforcement of coverage. In contrast, the tort of wrongful 
discharge is premised on the bare intentional action of discharging 
an employee, under circumstances where the public interest is 
harmed as a result of this action. There appears to be no sound 
reason to preclude the insurability of wrongful discharge claims per 
se, although certain wrongful discharge claims may involve the kind 
of intentional behavior that, if not outside the policy coverage, 
would be deemed uninsurable for reasons of public policy.92 
The circumstances under which courts will void coverage on 
the grounds of public policy have been carefully considered in a 
90. Dixon, 612 N.E.2d at 857. 
91. Dixon, 641 N.E.2d at 401-02. This distinction is expressed in Lumbermens 
Mut. Casualty Co. v. S-W Indus., Inc" 39 F.3d 1324, 1331 (6th CiT. 1994), where the 
court interpreted the policy language defining a covered occurrence as being neither 
"expected nor intended" as preserving "the element of 'fortuity'" by preventing in­
sureds from using liability coverage as a shield for the consequences of their' anticipated 
intentional conduct. The court distinguished this narrow limit on coverage from the 
"broader range of losses" constituting intentional torts and held that the employer's 
insurer must indemnify the employer for compensatory damages paid to an employee 
after suffering a jury verdict for an intentional tort. 
92. But see Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, 
698 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (interpreting a legislatively enunciated public policy against 
insuring willful acts to "bar the attempt to shift liability for intentional sexual harass­
ment and associated employment-related torts [claims of wrongful discharge, infliction 
of emotional distress, battery, and sexual assault] to an insurer"). However, Coit pri­
marily was a sexual harassment case involving particularly egregious behavior by the 
defendant and therefore probably should not be read as necessarily precluding cover­
age for all wrongful discharge claims. Cf U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Beltmann North Am. 
CO.,883 F.2d 564, 568-69 (7th Cir. 1989) (applying lIIinois law and holding that wrong­
ful discharge allegations will necessarily fall within the "actual malice" policy exclusion; 
subsequently disapproved in Dixon, 641 N.E.2d at 400). 
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number of cases involving discriminatory employment practices. In 
these cases the same dynamic is at work: on one hand courts are 
reluctant to leave third party plaintiffs without recourse to funds 
contractually owed the defendant employer, but on the other hand 
courts are hesitant to permit an employer to purchase insurance 
against prospective liability for discriminating against employees 
and applicants for employment. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, which prohibits employment discrimination, is similar to the 
tort of wrongful discharge in that liability may exist even in the ab­
sence of a specific intent to cause harm.93 In such cases of "dispa­
rate impact" discrimination, courts generally find that the existence 
of liability insurance does not undermine public policy.94 
In contrast, a claim by an employee that she has suffered "dis­
parate treatment" on discriminatory grounds necessarily includes 
an allegation that the employer intended to discriminate.95 Some 
courts have concluded that insurance coverage for intentional dis­
crimination would undermine the strong public policy against dis­
crimination.96 However, this position has been challenged by other 
93. TItle VII is codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2000h(6) (1988 & Supp. 1993). 
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the United States Supreme Court 
held that TItle VII was directed against discriminatory effects in the workplace as well 
as intentionally discriminatory actions by employers. In the lexicon of discrimination 
law, the former cases involve "disparate impact," whereas "disparate treatment" is in­
volved in the latter cases. 
94. See, e.g., Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.2d 1178, 1187-88 (7th Cir.), 
cen. denied, 449 U.S. 1033 (1980);Save Mart Supermarkets v. Underwriters at Lloyd's 
London, 843 F. Supp. 597, 606 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Union Camp Corp. v. Continental 
Casualty Co., 452 F. Supp. 565, 568 (S.D. Ga. 1978). 
95. When claiming "disparate treatment," the employee has an affirmative bur­
den of production and the ultimate burden of proof regarding the employer's discrimi­
natory intent. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). 
96. See, e.g., Foxon Packaging Corp. v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 905 F. Supp. 
1139 (1995). After holding that the racial discrimination charge was excluded from 
coverage, the court continued by declaring (in dicta) that insurance coverage for inten­
tional discrimination is void as against public policy. 
Aetna argues, and this court agrees, that the public policy of the State of 
Rhode Island as articulated in the Fair Labor Practices Act, militates against 
judicial creation of a safe harbor within which Foxon may presumably violate 
the law at will with impunity. Such a result would do violence to the public 
policy of the state and eviscerate the statute's intended guarantee of a work­
place free of discrimination. 
Foxon comes before this court to seek, in essence, insulation from its own 
wrongdoing ... It would be a clear violation of public policy if businesses and 
individuals could insure themselves against liability for committing intentional 
acts of discrimination. This result would promote, rather than deter discrimi­
natory behavior .... Foxon's knowing failure to address the blatantly discrim­
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courts that enforce coverage even for intentional "disparate treat­
ment" of employees, finding such coverage not to be contrary to 
public policy.97 The different results in these cases are not ex­
ina tory acts of its employees should not be condoned by shifting the burden of 

satisfying Hernandez's damage awards to Aetna. 

Id. at 1146. 

See also Coit, 18 Cal. Rptr, 2d 692 (interpreting state statute precluding insurance 
for willful acts with regard to a case involving egregious, predatory, and intentional 
sexual harassment and discrimination); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Atlanta Int'l Ins. Co., 781 
F. Supp. 80, 83 (D. Mass. 1992) (interpreting state statute precluding insurance for de­
liberate or intentional wrongdoing to preclude coverage in light allegations that the 
insured flagrantly and deliberately violated anti-discrimination provisions and govern­
ment orders); Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 23 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. 778 (D.D.C. 1980) (BNA); Continental Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, 772 P.2d 
6,9 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (concluding that "there is no coverage for an insured's inten­
tional acts, wrongful under the law of torts, because contractual intent and public policy 
coincide to prevent an insured from acting wrongfully knowing his insurance company 
will pay the damages"); Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc., 549 So. 2d 1005, 
1009 (Fla. 1989) (holding that permitting parties to insure against claims of intentional 
religious discrimination would encourage such discrimination). 
97. See, e.g., Union Camp, 452 F. Supp. at 567-68 (S.D. Ga. 1978) ("The proposi­
tion that insurance taken out by an employer to protect against liability under TItle VII 
will encourage violations of the Act is based on an assumption that is speculative and 
erroneous.... Where a class of employees is entitled to back pay under a court order 
and the employer is financially unable to comply with the same, insurance would pro­
vide the mandated compensation." The court noted that the insurer remains free to 
exclude such liabilities from coverage.); Clark-Peterson Co. v. Independent Ins. As­
socs., 492 N.W.2d 675 (Iowa 1992) (utilizing the doctrine of reasonable expectations to 
extend coverage beyond the precise terms of the policy). 
These cases often involve variations of D&O or E&O policies written for public 
school districts. These products insure against liabilities arising out of "wrongful acts" 
and generally do not exclude intentional wrongs. In fact, the very purpose of these 
policies is to protect an entity, usually a public school, from the substantial losses that it 
may incur vicariously and also for defending and indemnifying its employees for their 
wrongful acts, whether committed intentionally or negligently. Consequently, insurers 
must rely on public policy arguments in an effort to avoid coverage. See, e.g. School 
Dist. for the City of Royal Oak v. Continental Casualty Co., 912 F.2d 844, 847-50 (6th 
Cir. 1990); New Madrid County Reorg. Sch. Dist. No.1 v. Continental Casualty Co., 
904 F.2d 1236 (8th Cir. 1990); University of Ill. v. Continental Casualty Co., 599 N.E.2d 
1338, 1351 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992), appeal denied 606 N.E.2d 1235 (Ill. 1992) ("[W]e find 
there is no Illinois public policy prohibiting insuring for damages caused by one's inten­
tional acts except to the extent that the insured wrongdoer may not be the person who 
recovers the policy proceeds. The fact that many insurance policies contain an exclu­
sion for intentional conduct demonstrates insurers have not relied on any broad public 
policy. Defendant could have included such an exclusion in its BEL policy, but did not. 
This court will not rewrite the BEL policy to create an exclusion."); Independent Sch. 
Dist. No. 697, Eveleth v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 515 N.W.2d 576,580 (Minn. 
1994) ("We do not believe that a school district will discriminate against its employees 
simply because it carries wrongful act insurance coverage; nor do we believe that school 
districts carrying this type of insurance coverage have a license to commit intentional 
wrongs. Accordingly, we enforce the contract as it is written."); Cf Continental Casu­
alty Co. v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding that cover­
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plained by the use of different tests but rather in the application of 
an agreed balancing test: weighing the benefit to the plaintiff of per­
mitting insurance coverage against the harm to society of encourag­
ing future intentional wrongdoing.98 Courts permitting coverage 
reject the hypothesis that discrimination will be reduced by denying 
coverage. 
In short, then, public policy does not prohibit an employer 
sued for discrimination or wrongful discharge from ever obtaining a 
defense and indemnification under liability insurance. In fact, re­
cent court decisions evidence a willingness to permit insurance cov­
erage even for intentional acts by the employer. However, if the 
wrongful act amounts to a purposeful effort by the employer to 
cause injury to the employee, courts generally still will refuse to 
enforce otherwise available insurance for reasons of public policy. 
In such cases, though, it often is the case that the insurance policy 
will preclude coverage in unambiguous terms in either the insuring 
agreement or the exclusions, and so the public policy doctrine 
age for sexual harassment is unambiguous under the "wrongful acts" trigger and 
offering no discussion of any potential public policy bar to enforcement). 
The Royal Oak court cited an article by Professor Willborn with approval, conclud­
ing that the presumption that liability insurance might "stimulate" future discriminatory 
conduct is unfounded. See Steven L. Willborn, Insurance, Public Policy, and Employ­
ment Discrimination, 66 MINN. L. REv. 1003 (1982). Professor Willborn argues that 
insurance coverage generally should be enforced to effectuate the public policy favoring 
compensation unless the insured displays a "calculating intent" to engage in discrimina­
tion based on the existence of insurance. Id. at 1027-30. 
Of course, if the policy limits coverage to negligent acts, then "disparate treat­
ment" discrimination will fall outside the coverage even if public policy would permit 
coverage. See, e.g., Golf Course Super. Ass'n of Am. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 
London, 761 F. Supp. 1485, 1491 (D. Kan. 1991) (no coverage under policy language, 
although Kansas law permits coverage even for punitive damages awarded as a result of 
intentional acts for which the insured is vicariously liable); School Dist. No.1 v. Mission 
Ins. Co., 650 P.2d 929 (Or. Q. App. 1982). Similarly, when the plaintiff is suing only for 
bodily injuries, then an educational liability policy (which excludes such injuries from 
coverage) will not be triggered, although coverage under the insured's CGL policy may 
well be triggered. Wayne Township Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs v. Indiana Ins. Co., 650 
N.E.2d 1205, 1211·12 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (holding CGL coverage was triggered, but 
not coverage under an Educational Errors and Omissions Policy in a suit for injuries 
caused when a school principal sexually molested a student). 
98. Thus, in Ranger the court explicitly found that anti-discrimination legislation 
primarily is intended to deter wrongdoing rather than compensate victims, thereby tilt­
ing the balance toward prohibiting coverage. Ranger, 549 So. 2d at 1006-09. In con­
trast, in Royal Oak the court rejected the idea that insurance coverage would promote 
discriminatory practices, finding that "the prospect of escalating insurance costs and the 
trauma of litigation, to say nothing of the risk of uninsurable punitive damages, would 
normally neutralize any stimulative tendency the insurance might have"; thus, the court 
found little to counterbalance the public interest in providing a source of funds to the 
injured plaintiff. Royal Oak, 912 F.2d at 848. 
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should only rarely place an additional limitation on the scope of 
coverage.99 
99. In most cases, the intentional nature of the conduct will remove the case from 
coverage under the terms of the policy, and so the public policy issue need not be 
reached. See, e.g., American Guar. and Liability Ins. Co. v. Vista Medical Supply, 699 
F. Supp. 787, 789-90 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that California law permits insurance 
coverage unless there is a "preconceived design to inflict injury," but that the policy 
restricts coverage of intentional act to a much greater degree); Intermountain Gas Co. 
v. Industrial Indem. Co., 868 P.2d 510, 515 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994) (holding that inten­
tional discrimination is excluded under the policy); Daly Ditches Irrigation Dist. v. Na­
tional Sur. Corp., 764 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Mont. 1988). 
A recent Massachusetts case underscores the importance of policy exclusions in 
this regard. Shortly after being ordered to pay claimants who alleged "disparate treat­
ment" sex discrimination, the employer ceased operations. The claimants brought a 
direct action against the employer's CGL carrier to recover their judgment, but sum­
mary judgment was entered for the insurer on the ground that the policy excluded cov­
erage for intentional acts. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on this 
ground, not reaching the question whether coverage would be precluded under the stat­
utorily defined public policy against insuring intentional harm. Rideout v. Crum & For­
ster Commercial Ins., 633 N.E.2d 376 (Mass. 1994). It is conceivable that the public 
policy balancing under these particular facts, involving injured claimants with no other 
means to satisfy the judgment and a now defunct employer, might not void coverage 
had it been available. Although the existence of a statute defining the public policy of 
Massachusetts might be deemed to afford less leeway to courts, there still is room for 
judicial interpretation of what a finding of "willfulness" means as a matter of substan­
tive employment law. See, e.g., Andover Newton Technological Sch., Inc. v. Continen­
tal Casualty Co., 930 F.2d 89, 93 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding that coverage for a "willful" 
violation of federal age discrimination law is not subject to the statutory bar, since "will­
fulness" includes the "reckless disregard" of whether the conduct is prohibited). More­
over, even if the statute is deemed to preclude indemnification, it may not preclude 
enforcement of the insurer's duty to defend. Id. at 95. See also Republic Indem. Co. v. 
Superior Court, 273 Cal. Rptr. 331, 334 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (interpreting CAL. INS. 
CODE §533 (West 1994». But see Boston Housing Authority, 781 F. Supp. at 83-84. Cf 
Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B., 846 P.2d 792 (Cal. 1993) (statutory bar applies 
only to indemnification for the intentional conduct, and not to the duty to defend in a 
case that may involve some non-intentional acts giving rise to liability). 
A similar issue arises when an insured seeks indemnification for the punitive dam­
ages component of an otherwise covered loss. There has been a great deal of litigation 
regarding the insurability of punitive damages. 
The debate is a vigorous one. Not surprisingly, courts are split on the question 
of whether punitive damages liability for reckless, wanton, or grossly negligent 
conduct is uninsurable. Roughly two-thirds of the states that have considered 
the question have held that punitive damages are insurable, and the remaining 
states have held that punitive damages are not insurable. Where punitive 
damages are insurable, however, all states that have considered the matter 
recognize an exception when the insured's conduct is intentional. 
JERRY, supra note 29, at 352. See also Alan I. Widiss, Liability Insurance Coverage for 
Punitive Damages? Discerning Answers to the Conundrum Created by Disputes Involv­
ing Conflicting Public Policies, Pragmatic Considerations and Political Actions, 39 VILL. 
L. REv. 455, 493 (1994) (surveying the current state of the law and arguing that punitive 
damages ought to be insurable in many instances) and George L. Priest, Insurability 
and Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1009 (1989) ("Our courts conflict sharply: some 
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CONCLUSION 

Employment lawyers acting as defense counsel have grown 
weary of the willingness of courts in recent years to develop flexible 
common law responses to employee claims. However, this same 
judicial attitude works to the benefit of employers when they de­
mand a defense and seek indemnification under a liability insurance 
policy for employment-related claims. In both situations, the con­
temporary approach is to place less emphasis on the technical word­
ing of adhesion documents connected with the relationship in favor 
of upholding reasonable expectations.10o For the employer seeking 
insurance coverage of an employment-related claim, the maxim 
deny coverage on grounds of public policy; the majority allow coverage."). As Profes­
sor Priest notes, the increasing willingness to permit coverage of punitive damages is 
directly related to the substantial expansion of the availability of the remedy, to the 
extent that the traditional "requisite level of moral depravity to justify punitive liabil­
ity" that raises the public policy question in the first place may be lacking. Id. at 1034. 
Given the availability of punitive damages for many employment related claims, 
this question is of significant concern for employers and insurers. See, e.g., Lumber­
mens Mut. Casualty Co. v. S-W Indus., Inc., 39 F.3d 1324, 1329 (6th Cir. 1994), which 
held that an employer was not entitled to indemnification for a $2.5 million punitive 
damage award, although the employer was entitled to indemnification for compensa­
tory damages incurred as a result of an intentional tort. The Lumbermens court noted 
that, because punitive damages are designed to punish and deter, public policy weighs 
much more heavily against insurability than it does with respect to compensatory dam­
ages for intentional torts. Cf Wojciak v. Northern Package Corp., 310 N.W.2d 675, 680 
(Minn. 1981) (permitting employer to recover discretionary treble damages under stat­
ute prohibiting retaliatory discharge, since "the statute reflects as much concern for the 
employees' welfare as it does a desire to punish employers," in contrast to common law 
punitive damages). 
100. Despite this parallel at a very general level, however, it would be a mistake 
to conclude that substantive developments in employment law will translate directly to 
substantive changes in the interpretation of insurance policies. Employers will be sub­
jected to new forms of liability that are held not to be within the scope of their liability 
coverage, despite the (reasonable?) expectation that their liability policies would cover 
such unanticipated exposure. See, e.g., SL Indus., Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 
607 A.2d 1266, 1275 (N.J. 1992), which stated: 
Now that tort law has expanded to recognize claims for emotional distress, 
both with and without physical manifestations, the argument is that an insured 
would reasonably expect coverage to be extended to those suits. We disagree. 
Tort law and insurance law are not coextensive .... Regardless of changes in 
tort law, an insured does not reasonably expect the policy to be interpreted in 
ways that contravene the contract's language. 
Id. 
On the other hand, employers have not been held to the same remedial standards 
as insurers for breaches of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, just one example 
of the fact that their exposure to their employees is in some important respects more 
narrow than their insurer's exposure to them. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 
P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988) (distinguishing employers and insurers, holding that only insurers 
are subject to tort damages for a bad faith breach). 
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contra proferentem and the doctrine of reasonable expectations 
work to transform insurance policies into valuable economic re­
sources for managing the employer's exposure and losses. 
The flexibility evidenced in the court decisions is not unprinci­
pled, however. As in the employment context, at some point the 
courts respect the ability of insurers to define the scope of the risks 
that they are assuming. Insurers are most likely to be able to en­
force limitations on coverage for employment litigation if: (1) they 
limit their risks plainly and clearly and in accordance with the pol­
icy premiums being charged and (2) the limitations are either con­
sistent with the employer's reasonable expectations or are 
marketed in a manner designed to eliminate such expectations.101 
The recent efforts by insurers to amend their policies to exclude 
coverage for liability related to employment practices, if they prove 
successful in the market, likely will continue to pass judicial muster. 
If so, in many cases employers may be precluded from asserting 
potential coverage under the policy and thereby triggering the in­
surer's duty to defend. The law governing employment relations 
continues to change daily, though, and so the battles between em­
ployers and their insurers are far from over. 
101. Cf KEETON & WIDlSS, supra note 9. 
